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Articles
Commercial Law Intersections
GIULIANO G. CASTELLANO† & ANDREA TOSATO†
Commercial law is not a single, monolithic entity. It has grown into a dense thicket of subjectspecific branches that govern a broad range of transactions and corporate actions. When one
of such dealings or activities falls concurrently within the purview of two or more of these
commercial law branches—such as corporate law, intellectual property law, secured
transactions law, conduct and prudential regulation—an overlap materializes. We refer to
this legal phenomenon as a commercial law intersection (CLI).
CLIs are ubiquitous. Notable examples include traditional commercial transactions, such as
bank loans secured by shares, supply chain financing, or patent cross-licensing agreements,
as well as nascent FinTech arrangements, such as blockchain-based initial coin offerings and
other dealings in digital tokens.
CLIs present a multi-faceted challenge. The unharmonious convergence of commercial law
branches generates failures in coordination that both increase transaction costs and distort
incentives for market participants. Crucially, in the most severe cases, this affliction deters
business actors from entering into the affected transactions altogether. The cries of scholars,
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judges, and practitioners lamenting these issues have grown ever louder; yet methodical,
comprehensive solutions remain elusive.
This Article endeavors to fill this void. First, it provides a comprehensive analysis of CLIs
and the dynamics that give rise to coordination failures. Drawing from systems theory and
jurisprudence, it then identifies the deficiencies of the most common approaches used to
reconcile tensions between commercial law branches, before advancing the concepts of
“legal coherence” and “unity of purpose” as the key to addressing such shortcomings.
Finally, leveraging these insights, it formulates a normative blueprint, comprising a two-step
method which aims to assist lawmakers, regulators, and courts in untangling the Gordian
knot created by CLI coordination failures.
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INTRODUCTION
Commercial law is not a single, monolithic entity. Over time, it has evolved
into a fragmented1 bundle of subject-specific legal and regulatory regimes that
govern transactions and corporate actions in the course of business.2 Some of
these branches of commercial law stem from ancient mercantile practices, such
as the law of sales, the law of agency, secured transactions law, and corporate
law.3 Others have emerged in recent centuries to protect intellectual property,
safeguard competition from unreasonable trade restraints and monopolies, and
maintain the safety and soundness of the financial system.4
Reflecting the progressive retreat of the common law, commercial law
branches are increasingly codified in statutes and delegated administrative
enactments.5 These sources of law are articulated in rules and principles. Rules
are specific dispositions that are either prescriptive or proscriptive. Principles
are broad indications that set out an objective which can be legal, economic,

1. The idea of legal fragmentation was originally birthed in public international law literature. See Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) [hereinafter
Koskenniemi Report] (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (providing an exhaustive analysis of the notion of
“fragmentation of international law”). See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New
Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Martti
Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LJIL 553 (2002).
For its application in commercial law in the sense of sectorial fragmentation, see Giuliano G. Castellano &
Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63 (2018) (focusing on the fragmentation of legal and regulatory regimes governing secured credit); Joshua
Karton, Sectoral Fragmentation in Transnational Contract Law, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 142 (2018) (describing
how commercial law has split across sectorial lines both at domestic and international level); Andrea Tosato,
Intellectual Property License Contracts: Reflections on a Prospective UNCITRAL Project, 86 U. CIN. L. REV.
1251 (2018) (analyzing the fragmentation of the legal framework governing IP licensing); Panagiotis Delimatsis,
The Fragmentation of International Trade Law, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 87 (2011) (exploring the phenomenon of
fragmentation in international trade law); ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 3–8
(1998) (providing an historical account of the fragmentation of English commercial law).
2. In this Article, we adopt a functional and broad notion of “commercial law” encompassing all rules
and principles, of whatever source, that govern non-consumer transactions and entrepreneurial activity. This
conceptualization coincides with that traditionally adopted in civil law jurisdictions and also espoused by
common law scholars such as Layton Register, in the United States, and Sir Roy Goode, in England. See infra
notes 22–25 and related discussion in text.
3. See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 40–61 and accompanying text.
5. On the codification of commercial law, see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH ch. 1 (2018) (providing an exhaustive historical analysis); GOODE, supra note 1, at 3–7
(charting the trajectory of this phenomenon and describing the advent of commercial law codifications as the
“pre-eminence of dispositive law”); Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779 (1953)
(expounding the reasons for a commercial code in the United States); Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield
to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
351 (1983) (offering a U.S. perspective on this phenomenon).
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social, or even moral in nature.6 Through the lens of general systems theory,7
commercial law branches can be understood as autonomous systems of rules and
principles that supplement and derogate general doctrines of contract, tort,
restitution, and property law, to realize determinate policy aims.8
When a transaction or a corporate action falls concurrently within the
purview of two or more commercial law branches, an overlap materializes. We
refer to this legal phenomenon as a commercial law intersection (CLI). For
example, a transaction in which a bank extends a loan to a company and
simultaneously takes a security interest in the debtor’s shares, gives rise to a CLI
between secured transactions law and the legal regimes regulating securities and
banking activities.9 In the past, CLIs concerned a narrow circle of market
participants engaged in sophisticated transactions.10 However, over the past
three centuries, the intensifying fragmentation of commercial law, coupled with
the ascent of novel types of business interactions have caused CLIs to

6. The terms “rules,” “principles,” and “standards” do not have fixed and universally accepted meanings
in scholarly literature. In this Article, we use the terms “rules” and “principles” borrowing from the terminology
adopted by John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL.
47, 47–49 (2002), and Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1688–90 (1976), who speaks, on one hand, of “rules” and, on the other, of “standards” or “principles” or
“policies.” Notably our definition of “rules” and “principles” are also aligned with those of “rules” and
“standards” formulated by Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381–83 (1985); Lawrence
A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law,
Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 1418 (2007); HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155–58 (1994).
Ronald Dworkin also builds his theory of adjudication on the concepts of “rules” and “principles”, though his
definition of the latter is broader than our own. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–23
(1977).
7. General systems theory seeks to elaborate principles that apply to systems in general irrespective of
whether they are physical, biological, mathematical or sociological in nature. See generally Ludwig von
Bertalanffy, An Outline of General System Theory, 1 BRITISH J. FOR PHIL. OF SCI. 134 (1950) (laying the
foundations for general systems theory); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, 11 MAIN CURRENTS
MOD. THOUGHT 75, 75–83 (1955) (framing more expansively his theory); ANATOL RAPOPORT, GENERAL
SYSTEM THEORY: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS, at ii (1986) (“Proponents of general system theory
purport to seek integrating principles sufficiently general to apply to many different contexts: physical,
biological, psychological, and social.”).
8. The application of general system theory to legal studies has a long-standing tradition. Most notably,
the works of Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann have been groundbreaking in advancing legal scholarship.
See Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987); Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW:
A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY, supra, at 12 (positing that law and society are composed of subsystems and that communication among those is problematic); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner,
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law Diversity or
Cacophony: New Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Gunther
Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291 (1984)
[hereinafter Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society] (arguing that the law is fragmented into a series of subsystems engendering collisions among rules).
9. See STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 434–
43 (6th ed. 2016) (providing an exhaustive analysis the body of rules and principles that govern these
transactions).
10. This is the case, for instance, of international sales of commodities. See infra notes 68–70 and
accompanying text.
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proliferate.11 In fact, governmental and non-governmental organizations, both at
national and international levels, have emphasized that overlaps between
branches of commercial law are progressively surfacing across an expanding
range of business sectors, and they affect materially the day-to-day operations
and strategic choices of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as well as
multinational corporations.12
The spread of CLIs poses significant challenges. In principle, such
convergences should generate composite regimes that synergistically enable
persons to carry out their desired transaction. In practice, CLIs often suffer from
failures in coordination. In some cases, the intersecting commercial law
branches neither explicitly nor implicitly address the possibility of their overlap,
spawning an ambiguous gap in the law that shrouds the transaction in question
either partly or entirely. In others, the applicable rules and principles coalesce to
form an incongruous legal framework that is either rife with internal conflicts
(antinomies) or impedes the achievement of the parties’ intended outcomes.
Gaps and incongruences are not uncommon in the law. Their presence in
CLIs should not be deemed fatal. Indeed, legal scholars have long recognized
that varying degrees of vagueness pervade most legal frameworks.13
Considerations over the “optimal precision” of rules permeate the entire
spectrum of law-making. Seeking a balance of transparency, accessibility, and
congruence is paramount to the design of rules which are clear, flexible, and

11. On the proliferation and genesis and diffusion of transactions involving CLIs, see infra Part I.B.
12. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL PRACTICE GUIDE ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS, at 95, U.N. Sales No. E.20.V.6 (2020), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/19-10910_e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL PRACTICE GUIDE] (emphasizing “the need for
closer coordination between the Model Law and the national prudential regulatory framework”); UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, at 1–2, 22, 46, 53, 80, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12
(2007), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/09-82670_ebook-guide_
09-04-10english.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS:
SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 1–3, U.N. Sales No. E.11.V.6 (2010),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/10-57126_ebook_suppl_sr_
ip.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.17.V.1 (2016),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/19-08779_e_ebook.pdf
[hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; WORLD BANK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, COLLATERAL REGISTRIES
AND MOVABLE ASSET-BASED FINANCING: KNOWLEDGE GUIDE 4 (2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/32551/142346.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y [hereinafter WB KNOWLEDGE GUIDE]
(indicating the need for coordination between legal and regulatory regimes to promote financial inclusion)
(technical contents prepared by Marek Dubovec with support from Giuliano G. Castellano). More recently, the
problem of ensuring coordination between secured lending and prudential regulation has been highlighted in the
report of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, see GIULIANO G. CASTELLANO,
PRATIBHA CHHABRA, JOHN W. WILSON & MAHESH UTTAMCHANDANI, INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GRP.,
COORDINATING PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS FRAMEWORKS: A PRIMER (2020),
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/739451604998793072/pdf/Coordinating-Prudential-Regulationand-Secured-Transactions-Frameworks-A-Primer.pdf [hereinafter IFC REGULATORY PRIMER].
13. Vagueness in law is a topic that has fascinated legal scholars across numerous generations. An
exhaustive exploration of this notion lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry. See generally TIMOTHY A.O.
ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1994). For a collection of valuable attempts to link legal with philosophical
thinking about vagueness, see Symposium, Vagueness and Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 369 (2001).
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aligned with overarching policy objectives.14 For instance, the debate
concerning the adoption of principle-based or rule-based approaches to regulate
the integration of nascent technological advancements in finance (FinTech)
echoes a deeper struggle to find equilibrium between financial innovation and
the safety, soundness, and integrity of markets.15
Crucially, the particular gaps and incongruences that beset CLIs are
problematic because they have far-reaching negative consequences. Albeit with
scalar intensity, CLI coordination failures foist upon market participants an
inadequate legal infrastructure; the applicable regime is either difficult to
understand and operate or riddled with uncertainty regarding its outcomes. In all
these cases, there is an increase in transaction costs and a distortion of incentives
for the parties involved.16 In the most severe cases, CLI coordination failures
have a chilling effect which deters the parties from entering into the affected
transactions altogether. Notably, scholars, judges, practitioners, and a
comprehensive cohort of sectorial, governmental, and non-governmental

14. A seminal contribution to this debate was offered by Professor Colin Diver who noted that the design
of administrative rules requires to consider a set of key tradeoffs between “transparency” (that is, the clarity of
the words used), “accessibility” (that is, the ability to be applied to a variety of practical situations), and
“congruence” (that is, the alignment with the policy aims it intends to achieve). See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). Identifying an equilibrium between determinacy and
flexibility of rules is a multidimensional issue that is echoed in the debates concerning the aptness of general
principles and detailed rules to achieve policy aims. See e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative
Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853 (1999)
(focusing on environmental law issues and proposing to implement rules with a lower level of detail in order to
achieve policy aims).
15. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1311–13 (2016) (noting that principle-based regulation, while providing
for more flexibility, might lack of sufficient clarity, whereas rule-based regulation might bolster investors’
confidence towards nascent FinTech companies); see also Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the
Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 244–64 (2019) (noting the tension between regulatory clarity and
flexibility). For a policy analysis of the regulatory challenges in integrating digital assets and distributed ledger
technology in the credit market, see WORLD BANK, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY & SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: LEGAL, REGULATORY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES—GUIDANCE NOTES SERIES: NOTE
2: REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATING DIGITAL ASSETS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS IN CREDIT
ECOSYSTEMS
(2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34008/RegulatoryImplications-of-Integrating-Digital-Assets-and-Distributed-Ledgers-in-Credit-Ecosystems.pdf?sequence=1&is
Allowed=y (examining the regulatory implications of taking a variety of digital assets as collateral and adopting
distributed ledger technology in secured transactions framework) (technical contents prepared by Giuliano G.
Castellano).
16. Transaction costs refer to the costs involved in market exchanges, including the costs required for
discovering market prices, as well as the writing and enforcing contracts. Transaction costs are distinguished
from the costs of producing goods or services. Ronald Coase first introduced the concept of transaction costs in
his seminal 1937 work. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (conceptualizing
transaction costs and positing that firms emerge from cost-minimizing behavior, including transaction costs).
Subsequently, he demonstrated that in situations where transactions costs are high, the initial allocation of legal
rights has an impact on the efficiency of economic activities. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The Problem of Social Cost]. Oliver E. Williamson further developed
the notion, indicating that each transaction produces three types of transactions costs related to monitoring,
controlling, and managing transactions. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).

1006

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:999

organizations have repeatedly sounded the alarm about these issues.17
Nevertheless, principled and systematic solutions have not been forthcoming.
This Article endeavors to fill this void. Making an original contribution to
the broader understanding of commercial law, we highlight the key drivers
fueling the proliferation of CLIs and decipher the factors that cause problematic
overlaps between commercial law branches. Through these lenses, we formulate
a normative method that aims to offer guidance to courts and administrative
agencies grappling with the interpretation and application of rules and principles
engendering CLI coordination failures. Furthermore, it aspires to provide
lawmakers and regulators with a blueprint to realize harmonious synergies
between intersecting commercial law branches when articulating or reforming
legal and regulatory regimes.
As a preliminary step, we investigate whether the hermeneutical canons
and rulemaking18 approaches most commonly used to overcome gaps and
incongruences in the law offer useful tools to tackle CLI coordination failures.19
The focus of this analysis concentrates on interpretive and rulemaking methods
designed to ensure consistency between multiple legal regimes, such as lex
specialis and lex superior. Upon close scrutiny, we find that they all share a
common shortcoming. Their application leads to one of the intersecting branches
bluntly prevailing over the others in the CLI. Such an approach does not
integrate harmoniously the intersecting branches; rather it spawns a markedly
lopsided regime that exacerbates coordination failures and their negative
consequences.
17. Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the need for a better coordination between branches of
commercial law. See, e.g., Catherine Walsh, The Role of Party Autonomy in Determining the Third-Party Effects
of Assignments: Of “Secret Laws” and “Secret Liens”, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (2018) (emphasizing
the need for coordination across commercial law branches to expand access to credit); Giuliano G. Castellano
& Marek Dubovec, Global Regulatory Standards and Secured Transactions Law Reforms: At the Crossroad
Between Access to Credit and Financial Stability, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 531 (2018) (focusing on the
intersection between secured transactions law and prudential regulation); Cunningham, supra note 6
(denouncing the complexities of the intersections of corporate law, securities regulation, and accounting).
International organizations have indicated coordination issues as problematic. See, e.g., the UNCITRAL
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 9 (indicating that the applicability of secured transactions law in a given
legal system might be restricted by other laws); WB KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 35 (referring to
Castellano & Dubovec, supra, and indicating that the “lack of coordination between . . . areas of law could
hinder both access to credit and financial stability”). The urgent need to coordinate commercial law branches
affecting access to credit, pushed the World Bank to devise a reform strategy to ensure that secured transactions
law reforms and prudential regulation regimes are not implemented unharmoniously. See IFC REGULATORY
PRIMER, supra note 12, at 8 (citing this manuscript and adopting the notion of CLI conceptualized herein).
18. In this Article, the locution “rulemaking” is used broadly to indicate both the enacting of legislation
and the adoption of regulation.
19. Though some commentators have drawn a distinction between the notions of “construing” and
“interpreting” the law, in this Article we treat the two as coextensive. On interpretive methods to address gaps
and incongruences, see AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 61–83 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005);
EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 263–71 (1940); OLIVER JONES, BENNION ON
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION §§ 12–15 (7th ed. 2019); RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48–69
(John Bell & George Engel eds., 3d rev. ed. 1995); FRANCIS BENNION, UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW
LEGISLATION: DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION 41–54 (2001); 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 36–37, 40 (Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2019).
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Having identified the weaknesses of orthodox interpretive and rulemaking
methods, we advance the view that “legal coherence” is the key notion to tackle
CLI coordination failures.20 Drawing from legal theory and philosophy of
mathematics, we propose that the rules and principles forming a CLI should be
construed to be simultaneously consistent with each other and their appertaining
commercial law branches, and that such consistency should be achieved through
a “unity of purpose.”21 To this end, we argue that such unity of purpose should
be understood as the underlying socio-economic policies and political objectives
that the CLI in question is intended to achieve. Moreover, in line with an ample
body of jurisprudence theories, we posit that it should be extrapolated from a
combined assessment of textual and contextual elements.
Building on this theoretical framework, we formulate a two-step method to
address CLI coordination failures. The first step is deconstructive in nature. It
involves identifying precisely the rules and principles that engender the CLI
coordination failure under consideration, then appraising their systemic
relevance within their appertaining commercial law branch. For this assessment,
we propose a systemization that visualizes commercial law branches as tripartite
spherical structures, comprised of a core, a middle sphere, and an outer sphere.
We posit that each rule and principle of a commercial law branch can be
classified within one of these three concentric spheres, in decreasing order of
systemic relevance from the core to the outer sphere. The second step focuses
on fostering legal coherence. We propose that, having established whether the
rules and principles entangled in a CLI are related to the core, middle, or outer
sphere of their respective branches, one must tailor the approach to resolution
accordingly. Our analysis shows that instances which involve the core of one of
the intersecting branches tend to require nuanced normative assessments. By
contrast, coordination failures that only touch upon the middle and outer spheres
of the intersecting branches present a path to legal coherence that is not as
tortuous.

20. The body of scholarship exploring the notion of coherence is vast. See, e.g., Jaap Hage, Law and
Coherence, 17 RATIO JURIS 87 (2004); Stefano Bertea, The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and
Evaluation, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (2005); Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, A Revision of the Constitutive
and Epistemic Coherence Theories in Law, 14 RATIO JURIS 212 (2001); Aldo Schiavello, On “Coherence” and
“Law”: An Analysis of Different Models, 14 RATIO JURIS 233 (2001); Aleksander Peczenik, Law, Morality,
Coherence and Truth, 7 RATIO JURIS 146 (1994); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273
(1992); S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221 (1990);
Robert Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality,
3 RATIO JURIS 130 (1990); Neil MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON LEGAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, LUND, SWEDEN,
DECEMBER 11–14, 1983, at 235 (Aleksander Peczenik, Lars Lindahl & Bert van Roermund eds., 1984); Kenneth
J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear
Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1984); AULIS AARNIO, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES IN
JURISPRUDENCE (1983). In the context of international law, see Mads Andenas & Ludovica Chiussi, Cohesion,
Convergence and Coherence of International Law, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE COHERENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 9–34 (Mads Andenas, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Attila Tanzi & Jan Wouters eds., 2019).
21. See MacCormick, supra note 20, at 238; Raz, supra note 20, at 284–87 (speaking of “unity of
principle”); infra Part II.B.
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This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we describe the socioeconomic factors that fueled the inception and rise of CLIs. This is followed by
a systematic assessment of both the coordination failures that frequently surface
when commercial law branches overlap, and the ensuing negative consequences
for market participants. In Part II, we show that the gaps and incongruences that
vex CLIs cannot be overcome by relying on interpretive methods that
simplistically favor one of the intersecting branches over the other. We suggest
instead that an approach centered on the notion of legal coherence is required.
In Part III, we present our method for addressing CLI coordination failures. We
expound the assessments to be conducted, the factors to be weighed, and the
range of possible interventions that pave the path to attaining legal coherence.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS (CLIS)
There is no established definition of commercial law. In American
scholarship, it was traditionally understood as “the body of rules regulating
commerce,” encompassing “the laws governing individuals engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of objects” as well as “the laws regulating the
association of capital . . . and the protection of industrial property such as
patents, copyrights and trademarks.”22 More recently, in common parlance, the
expression “commercial law” has “become synonymous . . . with the legal rules
contained in the Uniform Commercial Code.”23 However, this colloquialism is
emblematic of the impact of codification, rather than a conscious narrowing of
the field. Likewise, English law scholars have long construed commercial law
broadly and functionally. Notably, Sir Roy Goode has stated that “[commercial
law] encompasses all those principles, rules and statutory provisions, of
whatever kind and from whatever source, which bear on the private law rights
and obligations of parties to commercial transactions, whether between
themselves or their relationship with others.”24 In civil law jurisdictions, albeit
not perfectly homogenously, commercial law has long been viewed as
comprising the rules and principles that govern entrepreneurial activity and the
enterprise in all its forms, including the laws of admiralty, agency, banking,
competition, corporations, industrial and intellectual property, insolvency,
insurance, negotiable instruments, sale, and secured credit.25
This Part begins by providing a detailed account of the process of
fragmentation of commercial law and the multiplication of its constituent
22. Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil and Commercial Law, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 240, 241, 244
(1912–1913).
23. JONATHAN A. EDDY & PETER WINSHIP, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 1 (1985).
24. GOODE, supra note 1, at 8–9. This broad understanding of commercial law has long been widespread
among English law scholars. See HENRY W. DISNEY, THE ELEMENTS OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1 (1908)
(“‘Commercial law’ is an expression which is incapable of strict definition, but which is used to comprehend all
that portion of the law of England which is more especially concerned with commerce, trade and business.”).
25. See Denis Tallon, Civil Law and Commercial Law, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2 (Konrad Zweigert ed., 1983) (providing a detailed comparative analysis of the
conceptualization of commercial law in Latin American and European continental jurisdictions and its dialogue
with the broader civil law).
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strands. Thereafter, it expounds the dynamics that have led commercial law
branches to intersect more often and, in turn, give rise to growing numbers of
CLIs. This is followed by an investigation of both the coordination failures that
regularly beset these intersections and their negative consequences.
A. THE FRAGMENTATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
The global economic landscape has developed at an unprecedented pace
over the past three centuries. The first, second, third, and fourth industrial
revolutions have reshaped the factors of production and dynamics of
consumption.26 An ever-expanding cohort of participants are engaged in the
demand and supply sides of increasingly international, interconnected, and
competitive markets.27 Coextensively, standardized, depersonalized,
multipartite dealings have soared in number and relevance, facilitated by the
advent of digitization, automation, data availability, and real-time processing
capabilities.28
Confronted with novel activities, interactions, business organizations, and
unprecedented capital flows, commercial law has responded by becoming
increasingly fragmented into subject-specific branches.29 At the domestic level,
this phenomenon has been evidenced by the inexorable specialization of legal
professionals and adjudicators, as well as the mounting recourse to codifications
and delegated rulemaking.30 At the international level, this splintering process
has been reflected in the rise of subject-specific multilateral treaties and soft law
instruments that, while promoting legal harmonization, have entrenched
26. See generally KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2017) (positing that the first
industrial revolution (1760–1840) was characterized by the advent of steam engines and railroads; the second
(late nineteenth century to early twentieth century) by mass production and electrification; the third (1960–1999)
by semiconductors, mainframes, personal computing, and the internet; and the fourth (2000–present) by mobile
internet, sensors, actuators, machine learning, and artificial intelligence).
27. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005) (theorizing that globalization has opened markets to large segments of the world population
who previously had no such access markedly and, in turn, levelled the competitive playing field); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED: ANTI-GLOBALIZATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP
(2017) (describing the dislocations and displacements caused by globalization, standardization, digitization and
automation, and analyzing their negative effects on determinate segments of society).
28. See generally 1 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) (providing an
historical account of the effect of these socio-economic developments on the cardinal common law doctrines
governing commercial contracts); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (analyzing the rise of consumer contracts of adhesion); David A.
Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (2018) (exploring the impact that these
developments have had in consumer contracts, analyzing “precatory terms” and the theorizing the emergence of
“relational contracts of adhesion”); HEIN KÖTZ, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 1–17 (Gill Mertens & Tony Weir
trans., 2d ed. 2017) (highlighting these changes and emphasizing the progressively harmonized response of
continental European contract law).
29. See Koskenniemi Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 7–19 (noting the fragmentation of the law); Karton, supra
note 1, at 162–90 (noting the fragmentation of commercial law along sectorial lines); Delimatsis, supra note 1,
at 88–96 (noting the fragmentation of international trade law).
30. See GOODE, supra note 1 (charting the trajectory of this phenomenon and describing the advent of
commercial law codifications as the “pre-eminence of dispositive law”); Bane, supra note 5, at 367–77 (offering
a U.S. perspective on this phenomenon).
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sectorial compartmentalization.31 This fragmentation has advanced along two
axes.
First, ancient regimes of commercial law have been compelled to renovate
and evolve to keep pace with novel demands of economic actors. For example,
the law of sales ventured beyond its Roman law and medieval core to
accommodate the eighteenth-century expansion in maritime and fluvial trade;32
incrementally, rules for executory agreements, implied warranties, and bona fide
purchasers were forged, alongside interim remedies and market-based criteria
for the quantification of expectation interest damages.33 More recently, at a
domestic level, laws of sales have had to grapple with bulk sales, electronic
contracting, and goods with embedded software;34 internationally, the
acceleration of global trade has led to a unified legal framework for cross-border
sales through binding multilateral treaties.35
In a similar vein, secured transactions law has undergone deep
transformations to accommodate the ingenuity of credit markets. Ancient
possessory security devices, such as pledges and liens,36 have given way to non-

31. See 9 PHILIP R. WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (3d ed. 2019); 1 JAN
DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW (7th
ed. 2019); ROY GOODE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS
(2018) (giving a comprehensive account of this phenomenon); ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN
MCKENDRICK & JEFFREY WOOL, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2012) (providing an encyclopedic overview of transnational commercial law
instruments); BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 2019) (providing a North American perspective).
32. See J.B. MOYLE, THE CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW: WITH REFERENCES TO THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND FRANCE (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1892) (providing an exhaustive comparison of
eighteenth-century sales laws in England, France, and Scotland).
33. This is not to suggest that many of these features did not exist in previous centuries, rather that they
became prominent with the first industrial revolution. See generally 1 ATIYAH, supra note 28, chs. 8–16; Morton
J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 936–46 (1974) (arguing
that the socio-economic impact of the first industrial revolution drove jurists to attack equitable conceptions of
exchange as inimical to emerging contract principles such as expectation damages); A.W.B. Simpson, The
Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 passim (1979) (criticizing Horowitz’s thesis
and suggesting that the transformation process of commercial contracts had deeper roots).
34. The history of the attempted revisions to U.C.C. Article 2 bear witness to these challenges. See Richard
E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607 (2001) (describing the
reasons underlying attempts to revise U.C.C. Article 2); Henry Gabriel, Uniform Commercial Code Article Two
Revisions: The View of the Trenches, 23 BARRY L. REV. 129 (2018) (examining attempts to revise U.C.C. Article
2 between 1999–2003).
35. See generally HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF U.S.
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2009) (providing a U.S. perspective); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Curious Case
of Transborder Sales Law: A Comparative Analysis of CESL, CISG, and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES
LAW UNIFICATION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 25, 25–57 (Ulrich Magnus ed.,
2012) (providing a comparative analysis of the CISG, CESL, and the U.C.C.).
36. See John H. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 389,
401–05 (1897) (analyzing the idea of pledge in the Pentateuch, the Mishna, and the Ghemara); FRITZ SCHULZ,
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 400–27 (1951) (analyzing consensual secured transactions in classical Roman law);
Roger J. Goebel, Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security, 36 TUL. L. REV. 29, 30–44 (1961) (offering
comprehensive history of the evolution of Roman secured transactions law).
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possessory interests recorded in public registries.37 Meanwhile, floating liens
have become common practice, effacing historically entrenched opposition.38
Furthermore, both domestically and internationally, this branch of commercial
law has moved away from its traditional arrangement into distinct security
devices, veering towards a functional approach that treats homogenously all
contractually created rights in personal property, for the purpose of securing an
obligation.39
In corporate law, the balance between the interests of managers,
shareholders, and a variety of stakeholders has profoundly changed over the past
three centuries.40 The burgeoning involvement of institutional investors in
ownership structures as well as in the decision-making processes of modern
corporations, has contributed to a shift in governance, styles, and structures.41
37. See George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History: The First Chattel
Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403 (2004) (charting the history of
non-possessory security interests in U.S. law); GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
5–250 (1965) (providing an historical account of U.S. secured transactions law prior to U.C.C. Article 9).
38. See GILMORE, supra note 37, at 354–65 (charting the history of floating liens in the U.S. and explaining
their treatment under U.C.C. Article 9); Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities
Among Secured Creditors and the “Floating Lien”, 72 HARV. L. REV. 838, 850–55, 873–74 (1959) (explicating
the treatment of floating liens under U.C.C. Article 9).
39. At the international level, the preeminent examples of this shift are provided by the UNCITRAL Model
Law and the Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note
12; Org. of Am. States [OAS], Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions (Feb. 8, 2002),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/secured_transactions_book_model_law.pdf. At the domestic level, see
Giuliano G. Castellano & Andrea Tosato, Personal Property Security Law: International Ambitions and Local
Realities, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 283, 307–37 (Lucio Ghia ed., 2d ed. 2019) (explaining the Italian
legal framework); Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell & Jorge Feliu Rey, Modernisation of the Law of Secured
Transactions in Spain, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 417,
421–32 (Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) (explaining the Spanish legal framework); Moritz
Brinkmann, The Peculiar Approach of German Law in the Field of Secured Transactions and Why It Has
Worked (So Far), in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, supra, at
339, 340–44 (providing the German legal framework); LOUISE GULLIFER, GOODE AND GULLIFER ON LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY (6th ed. 2018) (providing the English legal framework); MAREK DUBOVEC
& LOUISE GULLIFER, SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM IN AFRICA (2019) (providing an overview of
African jurisdictions).
40. For an historical analysis of the evolution of corporate law and the main drivers for change, see P.M.
Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237 (2008); Robert B.
Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Implications for the Twenty-First Century, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 3 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart
Thomas eds., 2019) (noting that corporate law has progressively acquired different attitudes towards key aspects
of the life of an incorporated entity, such as its legal personality and autonomy); Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller
Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373 (2019) (offering an insightful forecast about the impact that
blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations might have in the near future on business
organizations law and corporate law more broadly).
41. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263, 263–65
(2019) (arguing that “[t]he transformation of American equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has
relocated control over corporations from courts to markets and has led to the death of corporate law”) (footnote
omitted); Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 598 (2018) (highlighting the
significance of institutional shareholders in bank governance as a source of “private . . . monitoring”); Paul H.
Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1395–97 (2014) (noting that voting behavior of institutional shareholders has been
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Corporate failures, the credit crunch of 2007–2008, the global financial crisis of
2009, the European debt crisis of 2011–2012, as well as a widespread demand
for greater accountability of large private entities have spawned, inter alia, legal
and regulatory interventions to pierce the corporate veil.42 The result has been a
reconfiguration of the reach and applicability of corporate law.
Second, commercial law has expanded to govern segments of the business
world that either did not exist previously or did not warrant special legislation.
For example, in the eighteenth century, print commerce and steam-powered
mechanization spurred the seminal enactment of statutes that conceptualized
copyright and patents as personal proprietary rights.43 A hundred years later, the
expansion of consumer markets propelled the adoption of the legal framework
for registered trademarks to eradicate the use of confusing trade signs among
competitors.44 Over time, intellectual property (IP) law has shown creativity and
adaptability in response to electrification, electronics, communications
networks, and digitization.45 Concurrently, from the late nineteenth century, the
intensity in cross-border trade of IP products has fueled the creation and
expansion of a network of international conventions for copyrights, patents, and
trademarks.46
In a similar vein, at the close of the nineteenth century, modern antitrust
law emerged to subdue trusts, pools, and other concentrations,47 in both
influenced by regulatory changes requiring them to cast their votes in the best interests of stakeholders); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Preserving the Corporate Superego in a Time of Stress: An Essay on Ethics and Economics, 33
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 221, 229–48 (2017) (arguing that recent changes in corporate governance have been
fueling a style of corporate behavior that is characterized by the pursuit of short-term profits); Carla L. Reyes,
Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1,
16–24 (2017) (discussing how distributed ledger technology might enable the rise of novel business
organizations in which traditional directors and officers are no longer required).
42. This point, for instance, emerges from the rebuttal of the principle of “shareholders supremacy”
replaced by the “stakeholders supremacy” in the context of regulated financial institutions. See infra note 224.
43. A vast body of scholarship expounds the causal link between technological innovation and modern
copyright and patents law. See, e.g., Joanna Kostylo, From Gunpowder to Print: The Common Origins of
Copyright and Patent, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 21 (Ronan
Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010). Specifically, on copyright, see Oren Bracha, United
States Copyright, 1672–1909, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 335 (Isabella
Alexander & H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) (providing a history of U.S. copyright protection). For
patents, see Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001).
44. See Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: The Construction of the Legal Concept of
Trade Mark (1860–1880), in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 3 (Lionel Bently,
Jennifer Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2008) (charting the rise of modern trademarks law).
45. See Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and
Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee & Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993).
46. For a comprehensive overview of these international instruments and an exhaustive bibliography, see
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM O. HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLMUTTER, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008).
47. From the seventeenth century, Anglo-American common law developed rules that voided restraint of
trade contracts on public policy grounds, if they unreasonably constrained a person’s freedom to exercise their
profession. See 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56 (2d ed. 1937). These doctrines lay
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Canada48 and the United States.49 In the twentieth century, shepherded by
successive economic theories,50 this branch of commercial law crafted
substantive and procedural tools to safeguard “the competition process”51 from
anticompetitive vertical and horizontal agreements, and monopolistic
practices.52 In the twenty-first century, antitrust legislation has spread globally,
yet continues to lack a unitary international framework, thus remaining an
interrelated set of heterogenous domestic laws.53
Over the course of the past century, the previously described changes to
corporate law were matched by the exponential growth of financial regulation.
The divide between the banking, insurance, and investment sectors faded,
requiring regulatory and supervisory coordination. Subsequently, the financial
and corporate crises of the twenty-first century defined the global regulatory
agenda, leading to an ulterior expansion of the role attributed to administrative
agencies in the governance of financial markets.54 At present, financial
regulation comprises an heterogenous set of special rules and principles that can
be divided into conduct of business regulation (conduct regulation)55 and

the groundwork for subsequent Canadian and U.S. antitrust laws. See Brian Cheffins, The Development of
Competition Policy, 1890–1940: A Re-Evaluation of a Canadian and American Tradition, 27 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 449 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 1019 (1989).
48. An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, S.C. 1889,
c. 41 (Can.); see also Michael Bliss, Another Anti-Trust Tradition: Canadian Anti-Combines Policy, 1889–1910,
47 BUS. HIST. REV. 177 (1973); Jamie Benidickson, The Combines Problem in Canadian Legal Thought, 1867–
1920, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 799, 850 (1993).
49. See An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7); Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy
in Historical Perspective, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, Dec. 23, 2019, at 1
(providing an historical overview of the evolution of antitrust law in the United States).
50. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (rev. ed.
2001) (offering a chronological analysis of the successive political and economic theories that have influenced
U.S. antitrust law); ALISON JONES, BRENDA SUFRIN & NIAMH DUNNE, JONES AND SUFRIN’S EU COMPETITION
LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 13–76 (7th ed. 2019) (discussing the policies and theories underlying E.U.
competition law).
51. David J. Gerber, Comparative Competition Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
1169, 1181–91 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019) (using this expression to describe
broadly the combined subject matter of North American antitrust law and E.U. competition law).
52. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST §§ 1.3, 11.4 (2017); JONES ET AL., supra note 50, at 13–76.
53. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 119 (2010); Anu
Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Christopher Megaw & Nathaniel Sokol, Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing
the Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 411, 411–13
(2019).
54. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act established a new administrative agency, the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, to protect the stability of the financial system. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S.C.); see also infra note 198. For a critical analysis of the role of this new agency, see Hilary J. Allen,
Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087 (2015).
55. See Andrew F. Tuch, Conduct of Business Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 538 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015) (offering a definition of conduct
regulation and charting both its emergence and expansion).
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prudential regulation.56 Conduct regulation is chiefly concerned with both
protecting market integrity and fostering an ethical business culture, generally
referred to as a “culture of compliance.”57 Prudential regulation encompasses a
variety of regimes, broadly categorized in micro- and macro-prudential
regulation.58 Micro-prudential regulation is concerned with the solvency of
individual financial firms; for instance, in the United States, its implementation
for national banks is mandated to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC).59 Macro-prudential regulation aims to maintain the stability of the
financial system as a whole, thus curbing systemic risk;60 in the United States,
this task is the primary charge of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), instituted by the Dodd-Frank Act.61

56. On the definition prudential regulation, see ROSS CRANSTON, EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, KRISTIN VAN
ZWIETEN, CHRISTOPHER HARE & THEODORE VAN SANTE, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 31 (3d ed. 2018)
(“[P]rudential regulation has undergone seismic changes in the post-2008 period, at least in the USA, EU, and
the UK, as a result of the crisis.”).
57. The former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted that “[c]ulture relates to the
implicit norms that guide behavior in the absence of regulations or compliance rules—and sometimes despite
those explicit restraints.” William Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Workshop on
Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving
Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/DudleyEnhancing-Financial-Stability-by-Improving-Culture-in-the-Financial-Services-Industry.pdf. The Financial
Stability Board (FSB) has made ethics a component of its regulatory framework. See FIN. STABILITY BD.,
GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY INTERACTION WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON RISK CULTURE: A FRAMEWORK
FOR ASSESSING RISK CULTURE 1–2 (2014), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/140407.pdf; see also Dan
Awrey, William Blair & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in
Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013) (examining how law and markets might engender cultural
and ethical constraints).
58. In a famous speech delivered while he was serving as the General Manger of the Bank for International
Settlements and Chairman of the hitherto Financial Stability Forum, Andrew Crockett noted that “the macroprudential dimension focuses on the risk of correlated failures,” whereas “[t]he micro-prudential
dimension . . . considers each institution in its own right, is thus not concerned with correlations per se.” Andrew
D. Crockett, Gen. Manager of the Bank for Int’l Settlements & Chairman of the Fin. Stability F., Remarks Before
the Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Marrying the Micro- and Macro-Prudential
Dimensions of Financial Stability (Sept. 21, 2000), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp000921.htm.
59. The OCC is also tasked to supervise the implementation of conduct regulation. For an overview of the
supervisory framework for national banks, see HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 286–97 (22d ed. 2018); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R.
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 92–93 (6th ed. 2017). The idea of
separating conduct and prudential regulation, thus adopting a regulatory design that is similar to the one adopted
in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, has been advanced in various instances. See, e.g., DEP’T OF
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137–38 (2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/blueprint.pdf.
60. On the regulatory challenges posed by systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO.
L.J. 193, 198–206 (2008) (noting that systemic risk arises from a “tragedy of the commons” demanding specific
regulatory interventions); Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1389–1401 (2011) (arguing for a regulatory approach
that addresses systemic risk by reducing complexity in the financial system).
61. See supra note 53. For an analysis of the approach adopted by the FSOC to pursue its mandate, see
Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1849–64 (2017) (indicating that the ample discretion attributed to the FSOC is a
powerful regulatory tool, deterring firms and keeping regulators accountable).
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The preceding discourse has shown that the fragmentation of commercial
law has progressively spawned a multiplicity of distinct regimes. Even though
they stem from shared legal roots, they have flourished independently into
separate branches of commercial law. Each branch, in turn, constitutes an
autonomous system of rules and principles characterized by an internal logic that
ensures its continuity and development over time. Albeit to a varying degree,
such systems are both self-contained62 and self-referential.63 They are selfcontained in the sense that they establish a special regime for the dealings and
activities within their remit, and produce outcomes that differ from those that
would otherwise flow from general law doctrines.64 They are self-referential in
that they address gaps and incongruences pursuant to a logic that almost
exclusively references inwardly their own endogenous rules and principles
rather than exogenous legal elements.65
Therefore, commercial law branches may be described as autonomous
systems of rules and logical deductions that are exceptional in nature. They
supplement or derogate the laws of contract, tort, restitution, and property or
another commercial law branch. Financial regulation offers a lucid example of
these features. Rights and obligations between financial institutions and their
customers are largely grounded in deeply-rooted common law doctrines, further
supplemented by corporate law statutes and ad hoc regulatory provisions. In the
banking context, banks and depositors operate within a debtor-creditor
framework.66 Yet, financial regulation subjects banks to a special regime that
differs from that applicable to other corporate debtors, requiring them to
prioritize the interests of depositors over those of shareholders and enact special
risk-management processes.67
62. The notion of “self-contained regime” has its roots in international law. See Martti Koskenniemi
(Chairman of the Int’l Law Comm’n Study Group), Study on the Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule
and the Question of “Self-Contained Regimes”, ¶¶ 314–30, U.N. Doc. ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1 (2004);
Koskenniemi Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 123–37 (expounding the multifarious meanings which the notion of “selfcontained regime” has assumed in international public law). Among international law scholars, this notion has
spawned a contentious debate regarding whether a system of rules can ever be completely severed from general
law. See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International
Law, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 483 (2006) (describing this debate).
63. The notion of a “self-referential” system has roots both in biology of cognition and social systems
theory. See HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND COGNITION: THE
REALIZATION OF THE LIVING (1980) (proposing that self-referentiality is the quality of a system to build for itself
the components of which it consists); 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 49–54 (Rhodes Barrett trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2013) (1997) (theorizing that a system is self-referential if it “itself constitutes the elements
that compose it as functional unities”); Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra note 8, at 293–95
(building on Luhmann’s theory and emphasizing the circular relationship between legal decisions and normative
rules).
64. We do not intend to suggest that commercial law branches exist in isolation and are disconnected from
general law, rather we emphasize that they supplement and derogate general doctrines of contract, tort and
restitution. Consistently with international law scholars and legal philosophers, we recognize that special
regimes can never be entirely severed from general law. See Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 492–93
(cogently arguing that no system can be completely severed from general law).
65. See Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra note 8, at 295–96.
66. See infra notes 212–214 and accompanying text.
67. See infra Part III.A.2.
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B. THE BIRTH AND PROLIFERATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS
A CLI arises from the partial overlap of two or more commercial law
branches. This occurs when a transaction possesses traits and attributes that fall
concurrently within the purview of two or more branches of commercial law.
The coming into contact of distinct self-contained systems generates a new subsystem of rules and logical deductions. Its scope is narrower than that of any of
the converging branches, and its span is limited to the extent of their overlap. Its
function is to provide commercial actors with a legal regime that enables them
to carry out the transaction in question according to their idiosyncratic
preferences.
CLIs have evolved and proliferated in lockstep with the fragmentation of
commercial law. In the nineteenth century, transactions giving rise to CLIs were
few and relatively uncomplicated. For example, international sales of
commodities—typically “cost, insurance, freight” (CIF)68 or “free on board”
(FOB)69—in which the laws of sales, insurance, and maritime transportation
converged at numerous junctures.70
During the twentieth century, CLIs multiplied and their complexity
escalated. For instance, domestic corporations transmuted into regional and
multinational conglomerates that operate through joint ventures and subsidiaries
enjoined by a nexus of contracts that create intersections among corporate,
agency, IP and, often, antitrust laws.71 Similarly, globalization rendered the
financing of supply chains materially reliant on dealings that entwine the laws
of sales, insurance, and multi-modal transportation with, inter alia, the laws of
banking, documents of title, secured transactions, and factoring.72

68. Legal historians identify Tregelles v. Sewell (1862) 158 Eng. Rep. 600; 7 H&N 575 (Eng.), as one of
the first reported cases involving an international CIF transaction. See Edward A. Craighill, Jr., Sales of Goods
on C.I.F. Terms, 6 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1919) (charting the history of CIF contracts in U.S. law).
69. For the modern legislative definition of FOB contracts, see U.C.C. § 2-319 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2020). The first reported case of an FOB sale is Wackerbarth v. Masson, (1812) 170 Eng. Rep. 1378;
3 Camp. 270 (Eng.). For the history of FOB contracts, see Ademuni-Odeke, Insurance of F.O.B. Contracts in
Anglo-American and Common Law Jurisdictions Revisited: The Wider Picture, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 425, 430–32
(2007).
70. For the modern legislative definition of CIF contracts, see U.C.C. §§ 2-320 to 2-321. In CIF
transactions, a seller agrees to deliver the goods to a carrier, to arrange for their transportation, to take the
customary insurance on them for the buyer’s benefit against the risks of the voyage, to prepay or credit the
freight, and to tender the shipping documents to the buyer. The buyer agrees to pay the purchase price upon
presentation of the shipping documents. See Philip W. Thayer, C.I.F. Contracts in International Commerce, 53
HARV. L. REV. 792, 792–93 (1940) (analyzing CIF contracts and emphasizing the intersection between the laws
of sales, insurance, maritime transport, and payments).
71. For an overview of these CLIs, see RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTINE, MICHAEL D.
RAMSEY & MATTHEW P. SCHAEFER, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK 865–1082 (13th ed. 2019); DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, HANNAH L. BUXBAUM &
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 257–493 (6th ed. 2019).
72. For example, see Boris Kozolchyk, Supply Chain Financing, Straight Bills of Lading and Standby
Letters of Credit, 2 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 100, 118–22 (2011) (expounding the issues presented by
straight bills of lading in supply chain financing and exploring the intersection between U.C.C. Articles 5 and 9,
and banking law); Abhinayan Basu Bal, Can UNCITRAL Instruments Advance Supply Chain Finance to Benefit
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Most recently, the twenty-first century has witnessed a further surge in
CLIs fueled by technological advancements. The inexorable spread of the
internet through wireless mobile devices, coupled with the rise of big data, cloud
computing, artificial intelligence, distributed ledger technology, and digital
assets has ushered a wave of novel business models and commercial dealings.
In this landscape, intersections between the laws of payments, banking,
securities, and agency feature prominently, as emblematically demonstrated by
the case of “stablecoins.”73 More generally, digital assets engender CLIs that
involve the laws of secured transactions and insolvency,74 reaching into
foundational aspects of property law and the law of obligations.75
Small and Medium Enterprises?, in 4 MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 156, 156–66 (2017), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/17-06783_ebook.pdf (exploring the intersection between the laws governing electronic
transferable records, carriage of goods at sea, and secured transactions law); EURO BANKING ASS’N, SUPPLY
CHAIN FINANCE: EBA EUROPEAN MARKET GUIDE 44–66 (2014), https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/
production/1544/eba-market-guide-on-supply-chain-finance-version-20.pdf (mapping the commercial law
overlaps that arise in “receivable finance” and “inventory finance”). Notably, the relevance of the intersection
between the law governing assignments of intangibles and financial regulation has emerged markedly, in the
context of international initiatives aimed at promoting access to credit through factoring activities. In particular,
coordination between rules governing the assignment of receivables and regulatory requirements has been
highlighted as a crucial issue by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in
the travaux preparatoire for its prospective Model Law on Factoring. See Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Priv.
L. [UNIDROIT], Factoring Model Law Working Group: First Session, at 11, Study LVIII A–W.G.1–Doc. 3
(2020), https://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2020/study58a/wg01/s-58a-wg-01-03-rev01-e.pdf
(indicating that contractual rights of payment are affected by regulatory requirements).
73. According to the Financial Stability Board, stablecoin refers to a digital asset that “aims to maintain a
stable value relative to a specified asset, or a pool or basket of assets.” FIN. STABILITY BD., REGULATION,
SUPERVISION AND OVERSIGHT OF “GLOBAL STABLECOIN” ARRANGEMENTS 9 (2020), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P131020-3.pdf. Although stablecoins are still in their infancy, the prospect of privately issued,
global stablecoins prompted policymakers and commentators to highlight that such digital assets would raise
concerns in multiple regulatory areas. See Anton Didenko, Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P.
Buckley, After Libra, Digital Yuan and COVID-19: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the New World of
Money and Payment Systems 18–19 (European Banking Inst., Working Paper No. 65, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.3622311; J.S. Nelson, Cryptocommunity Currencies, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 925–28, 928 n.94
(2020); Douglas Arner, Raphael Auer & Jon Frost, Stablecoins: Risks, Potential and Regulation 2–5 (BIS
Working Papers, Paper No. 905, 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/work905.pdf; Marco Dell’Erba, Stablecoins
in Cryptoeconomics from Initial Coin Offerings to Central Bank Digital Currencies, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 1 (2019). Regarding the CLIs emerging from the use of stablecoins as collateral, see WORLD BANK, supra
note 15, at 25–30.
74. On the CLIs engendered by the use of digital assets as collateral, see infra note 168 and accompanying
text. For preliminary analyses of the legal challenges posed by digital assets in insolvency proceedings, see
Matthias Haentjens, Tycho De Graaf & Ilya Kokorin, The Failed Hopes of Disintermediation: Crypto-Custodian
Insolvency, Legal Risks and How to Avoid Them, 2020 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 526 (2020) (highlighting that
bankruptcies of “crypto-custodians” give rise to tensions between different branches of commercial law); Miriam
R. Albert & J. Scott Colesanti, Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status for Investors
in Initial Coin Offerings, 36 GA. ST. U. L REV. 233 (2020) (suggesting that the interface between securities and
bankruptcy law has to be recast in light of the challenges presented by initial coin offering); Jannis Sarra &
Louise Gullifer, Crypto‐Claimants and Bitcoin Bankruptcy: Challenges for Recognition and Realization, 28
INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 233 (2019) (mapping the junctures at which digital assets engender tension between
bankruptcy law and other commercial law branches).
75. On the property law issues generally created by digital assets, see generally J.G. Allen, Property in
Digital Coins, 8 EUROPEAN PROP. L.J. 64 (2019) (exploring the conceptual basis of property in digital coins in

1018

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:999

Coextensively, intensified efforts to regulate the finance sector have further
bolstered the frequency of CLIs. The involvement of financial institutions and
activities that are regulated necessarily implies the emergence of a CLI in which
aspects traditionally governed under commercial law intersect with rules and
principles concerned with regulated firms and activities. Conduct regulation, for
instance, regulates the behavior of financial institutions towards the public in
order to avert the risk of misconduct that could hinder the functioning of (and,
thus, the confidence in) the financial system.76 These rules stem from the need
to protect public interests and are codified in a variety of provisions, including
those designed to combat money laundering activities,77 limit fraudulent
practices, and other attempts to manipulate markets.78 Licensing requirements
and product approval procedures are also part of the wide spectrum of rules
defining conduct regulation; their implementation necessitates coordination with
the corporate and contractual dimension of business transactions.79 Furthermore,
the intersection between administrative law provisions and corporate
governance is epitomized by the regimes imposing limits to compensation for
executive officers.80 In this context, financial institutions are deemed to live in
an “era of regulatory compliance,” in which regulatory requirements
complement, or supplant, corporate law precepts.81
terms of a new category of property); David Fox, Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property, in
CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 139 (David Fox & Sarah Green eds., 2019) (suggesting that
the category of property at common is sufficiently flexible to accommodate digital assets such as
cryptocurrencies).
76. By and large, conduct of business regulation reflects the policy objective of protecting market integrity
and is concerned with how firms operate their businesses. See infra note 195; see also JOHN ARMOUR, DAN
AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY GORDON, COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION 63 (2016) (“Functionally, they can be thought of as mandatory terms of the contractual
relationship between the client and the intermediary, responding to agency costs.”).
77. In the United States, the core statute setting anti-money laundering rules is the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31
U.S.C.), with the amendments introduced by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
78. On the different practices used to manipulate markets, see David C. Donald, Regulating Market
Manipulation Through an Understanding of Price Creation, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 55, 70–71 (2011)
(noting that in trade-based manipulative conduct “[i]ntegrity is challenged by trades that, in the context of a
given market structure and a given market atmosphere, put pressure on the price creation process without any
relationship to quality”).
79. These set of rules are commonly known as “entry regulation” and “product regulation.” See ARMOUR
ET AL., supra note 76, at 74–75. On the intersection between financial regulation and corporate governance, see
Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini & Gerard van Solinge, Governing Financial Institutions: Law and Regulation,
Conduct and Culture, in GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 13 (Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini &
Gerard van Solinge eds., 2019) (“[R]egulators rely on corporate governance as a complement to financial
supervision, which explains why regulation is on the rise.”).
80. See infra note 225.
81. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075,
2075 (2016) (noting that “[c]ompliance is the new corporate governance” and arguing that the impact of
compliance requirements is changing the way corporations operate making traditional corporate theory
outdated); see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (noting
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As a result of their proliferation, CLIs have come to involve market
participants of all guises rather than remaining the exclusive domain of
sophisticated actors. This development has been especially apparent regarding
credit dealings designed to facilitate inclusive access to finance for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), individuals, and startups, as these transactions
increasingly feature the convergence of many branches of commercial law. For
example, SMEs operating in the agricultural sector—both in developed and
developing economies—do not infrequently rely on warehouse receipts
financing.82 In these transactions, individual farmers and cooperatives obtain
working capital from financial institutions by offering warehouse receipts as
collateral to secure their repayment obligations;83 in these dealings multiple
intersections occur between the laws of agency, documents of title, insurance,
secured transactions, and financial regulation.
International organizations have implicitly recognized the strategic
relevance of CLIs in the pursuit of development policies. Both the UN
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank
Group have emphasized that the achievement of the Sustainable Development
Goals84 necessitates law reforms which ensure the seamless and synergetic
confluence of different commercial law branches.85 Emblematically, the
UNCITRAL Practice Guide to the Model Law on Secured Transactions has
noted that coordination between contract law, property law, intellectual property
law, negotiable instruments law, insolvency law, civil procedure law, and
secured transactions law is of critical importance to an inclusive regime for
access to credit.86 In addition, the same instrument features a chapter devoted to

the expansion of the compliance industry, following major scandals and misconduct, but questioning the
effectiveness of new compliance regimes).
82. For an overview of the widespread use warehouse receipts financing in developing and developed
economies, see Int’l Ass’n for the Unification of Priv. L. [UNIDROIT], Model Law on Warehouse Receipts,
Study 83–W.G.1–Doc. 4 (2020), https://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2020/study83/wg01/s-83-wg0104-e.pdf; Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Designing Warehouse Receipt Legislation: Regulatory Options
and Recent Trends 1–5 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/i4318e/i4318e.pdf; World Bank Grp. [WBG], A Guide to
Warehouse Receipt Financing Reform: Legislative Reform 1–17 (2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/25189.
83. See Marek Dubovec & Adalberto Elias, A Proposal for UNCITRAL to Develop a Model Law on
Warehouse Receipts, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 716, 718–19 (2017) (highlighting commercial law branches overlaps in
warehouse receipts financing transactions and suggesting the need for an international soft-law instrument to
promote modernization and harmonization).
84. The international instruments adopted by UNCITRAL and the law reforms facilitated by the World
Bank aim to establish a legal infrastructure to foster an inclusive access to credit towards the realization of the
overarching goal of eradicating poverty by 2030. See G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept. 25, 2015); WB KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 4; IFC
REGULATORY PRIMER, supra note 12, at 10 (“[C]oordination between secured transactions law and financial
regulation is key to promote secured lending and ensure that . . . reforms achieve their full potential.”).
85. See supra note 17.
86. See UNCITRAL PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 12, ¶¶ 23–25.
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assisting regulated financial institutions in the coordination of secured
transactions law and prudential regulation.87
C. COORDINATION FAILURES
CLIs can be problematic. Almost two decades ago, reflecting on the
fragmentation of the global legal order along social and economic sectoral lines,
Fischer-Lescano and Gunter Teubner presciently hypothesized that “should the
law of a global society become entangled within sectoral interdependences, a
wholly new form of conflicts law will emerge.”88 Similarly, the fragmentation
of commercial law, combined with the proliferation of transactions that fall
concurrently within the remit of multiple commercial law branches has spawned
the phenomenon of CLIs. On occasion, these convergences produce harmonious
coalescences that facilitate both voluntary exchanges and the efficient allocation
of capital. With escalating frequency, however, CLIs are hindered by failures in
coordination of varying severity. We posit that these failures can be divided into
two classes.
The first class comprises coordination failures stemming from gaps in the
law.89 In such instances, intersecting branches do not govern the CLI at hand
expressly or implicitly but leave it instead either partly or entirely shrouded in
silence. For example, transactions in which a registered trademark is used as
collateral engender a CLI between secured transactions law and trademarks
law.90 Assuming hypothetically that a person first grants a security interest in
one of their trademarks to a creditor, and then subsequently assigns this same
trademark to another person, it is well-established that Article 9 governs the
87. Id. ¶¶ 365–72; see also Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 17 (providing the first systematic analysis
of the coordination failures between secured transactions law and financial regulation and for suggestions on for
their possible resolution).
88. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 8, at 1000 (describing such collisions as “intersystemic
conflicts law” that are “derived not from collisions between the distinct nations of private international law, but
from collisions between distinct global social sectors”).
89. Legal gaps (or lacunae) have been the subject of a vast body of scholarship. This Article is only
concerned with the issue of gaps in dispositive sources of law, such as legal statutes and administrative
enactments. See BARAK, supra note 18, at 66–72 (analyzing the nature of statutory gaps and providing an
exhaustive bibliography); Marijan Pavčnik, Why Discuss Gaps in the Law?, 9 RATIO JURIS 72 (1996) (providing
a map the issues created by statutory gaps); FERNANDO ATRIA, ON LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 76–87 (2002)
(examining a broad range of theories to address statutory gaps). This Article is not concerned with the issue of
whether there are social contexts in which no law applies. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 242–46
(Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1934) (identifying this issue and presenting his theory that the
law is gapless). Neither is this Article concerned with the issue of gaps in contracts, wills, and other private law
instruments. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 393–99 (2004) (providing an exhaustive map of the theoretical issues presented by gaps
in contracts); Heinz Strohbach, Filling Gaps in Contracts, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 486–87 (1979) (analyzing
comparatively contract gaps in the context of arbitration).
90. For an analysis of the legal framework governing the use of trademarks as collateral, see Thomas M.
Ward, The Perfection and Priority Rules for Security Interests in Copyrights, Patents, and Trademarks: The
Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed Legislative Cures, 53 ME. L. REV. 391, 440–48 (2001); XuanThao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1, 24–29 (2007); John L. Mesrobian &
Kenneth R. Schaefer, Secured Transactions Based on Intellectual Property, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 827, 849–56 (1990).
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creation of this security interest, its enforceability against third parties
(perfection), and priority against other secured creditors. It is equally
uncontentious that the Lanham Act91 governs trademark assignments. However,
neither Article 9 nor the Lanham Act address conflicts between secured creditors
and trademarks transferees. It is unclear whether a perfected security interest in
a registered trademark prevails over either a subsequent assignment of this same
trademark recorded in the Trademarks Register or even a prior unrecorded
transfer. It is equally unsettled whether recording a security interest in the
Trademarks Register serves as actual or constructive notice for third parties.
These issues are entirely uncertain.92
The second class encompasses coordination failures arising from
incongruences.93 This occurs when the combined application of the rules and
principles of the intersecting commercial law branches result in a regime that is
either contradictory, dysfunctional, or a combination of the two. For example,
the relevant provisions may establish prescriptions and proscriptions that are
either partially or entirely conflicting. Alternatively, the respective scope of
application of the rules and standards in question may be unclear. Still
differently, the regime hatched by the intersecting commercial law branches
may, holistically considered, impede the parties from achieving their intended
outcomes for the transactions in question. A case in point is offered by the CLI
between secured transactions law and financial regulation. In the United States,
when a federally chartered bank94 secures a commercial loan against an item of
personal property, the ensuing transaction attracts the attention of both Article 9
and Title 12 (Banks and Banking) of the Code of Federal Regulations.95 In this
scenario, an incongruence may ensue because secured transactions law qualifies
this dealing as secured credit, whereas the applicable regulatory regime might
treat it as unsecured due to the encumbered asset not possessing the required
attributes.96
91. Lantham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
92. See Ward, supra note 90, at 443–45; Nguyen, supra note 90, at 24–26.
93. In this Article, we use the term “incongruence” in a sense similar to that used by Colin Diver for
administrative lawmaking, albeit adapting it to the context of CLIs coordination failures. See Diver, supra note
14, at 67.
94. In this case, banks are chartered and regulated by the OCC under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1 (2018).
95. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020); Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1–199
(2020).
96. Only certain types of collateral can be effectively used to reduce credit risk and, thus, capital
requirements. Specifically, the bank must have a first-priority interest on the collateral which must be in the form
of:
(i) Cash on deposit with the national bank or Federal savings association . . . ;
(ii) Gold bullion;
(iii) Long-term debt securities that are not resecuritization exposures and that are investment
grade;
(iv) Short-term debt instruments that are not resecuritization exposures and that are investment
grade;
(v) Equity securities that are publicly traded;
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CLI coordination failures have diverse negative consequences, the
intensity of which is scalar rather than binary. In some cases, they reduce legal
certainty, as parties are required to contend with a framework the outcomes of
which are difficult to predict ex ante. In others, they increase complexity by
spawning a regime that is challenging both to comprehend and operate. In others
still, insufficient or flawed coordination between intersecting commercial law
branches yields an incoherent body of rules that does not align with reasonable
expectations. In all these cases, there is a distortion of incentives for the involved
parties.
Crucially, CLI coordination failures raise transaction costs. They render
more onerous the negotiation process, the drafting of contracts, the gathering of
the information required to discover prices, and the settling of disputes. The
relative burden of these transaction costs is proportional to the intensity of the
coordination failures from which they emanate. When they are minimal, the
ensuing transaction costs will likely be a manageable burden that parties can
offset comfortably through the benefits obtained from their voluntary exchange.
However, when CLI coordination failures are substantial, they carry heftier
transaction costs that will push parties to contemplate alternative otherwise less
attractive dealings.97 In the most severe cases, CLI coordination failures will
have a chilling effect, generating costs of such magnitude as to completely deter
parties from entering into these transactions.98
Another illustrative example of these issues is provided by CLIs involving
financial regulation and secured transactions law. As a general proposition,
capital adequacy standards compel banks to maintain, at any point in time, a
minimum level of capital (or regulatory capital) that is composed of a bank’s
own funds—which include shareholders’ equity and equity-like instruments—
and is relative to both the total assets of the bank and its actual exposure to
risks.99 The resulting framework is risk-based, as a higher portion of a bank’s

(vi) Convertible bonds that are publicly traded; or
(vii) Money market fund shares and other mutual fund shares if a price for the shares is publicly
quoted daily.
12 C.F.R. § 3.2; see also id. § 3.37 (setting forth rules on collateralized transactions).
97. This phenomenon is a direct consequence of the problem highlighted by Ronald Coase and positing
that when transactions costs are excessively high, the optimal allocation of resources might never occur. See
generally supra note 16, and, in particular, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 16, at 27.
98. This point emerges clearly once coordination failures are examined through the analytical lenses of
Williamson’s seminal works. Certain CLIs involve transactions that are “nonstandard” and require investments
that cannot be determined by market-aggregate dynamics. See Williamson, supra note 16, at 246–47 (classifying
commercial transactions based on their “frequency,” which can be “one-time, occasional, and recurrent,” and on
their investments characteristics, which can be “nonspecific, mixed, and idiosyncratic”). Typically, parties value
such transactions due to their design features that, in principle, allow to address specific business needs.
However, as uncertainties increase sharply in nonstandard transactions, the incentives to enter into such dealings
weaken. See id. at 248. If the legal framework does not reduce such uncertainties, parties might “sacrifice valued
design features in favor of a more standardized” arrangement. Id. at 251. Therefore, when CLI coordination
failures result into an excessive level uncertainty, parties might prefer not to enter into such transactions
altogether.
99. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 59, at 504–11; ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 76, at 290–301.
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own funds is needed to finance riskier loans.100 Therefore, banks are incentivized
to reduce their exposure to credit risk in order to maximize their return on
equity.101 To this end, banks may reduce capital requirements in various
fashions, including the adoption of credit risk mitigants, such as security
interests. However, as loans secured with collateral other than financial
collateral are subject to the same level of capital requirements attributed to
unsecured lending, banks might not be incentivized to extend loans secured with
any other personal property.102 Such a paradox affects the structure of incentives
in credit markets, as legal and regulatory requirements affect lending behavior
in an uneven manner.103 Capital regulation only applies to banking businesses;
while any prospective lender can take advantage of the broad applicability of
secured transactions law. Given that capital adequacy standards induce banks to
invest in operations that require less capital than asset-based lending to SMEs,
the coordination failure under consideration unwittingly favors the extension of
such a form of credit outside the banking system.104
The use of unregistered copyrights as collateral gives rise to a CLI between
secured transactions law and copyright law which presents similar issues.105 The
prevailing judicial view is that the creation of security interests in all types of
copyright (both registered and unregistered) is governed by Article 9.106
Perfection and priority of security interests in registered copyrights is subject to
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Registry.107 By contrast, perfection and
100. This means that regulatory capital connects risk to banks’ equity (or, more generally, own funds). See
Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71.
101. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES 110–11 (2013) (noting that
the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem on corporate finance are not met because deposit guarantees
schemes as well as favorable tax treatment for debt instruments result in a lower cost of debt); see also Castellano
& Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that the regulatory risk-weights “are the pivot steering the choices of
individual banks, as they determine the costs of funding for the extension of credit”). The tendency of banks to
maximize return on equity by reducing the cost of capital has also been associated with regulatory arbitrage
strategies. See David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000); Erik F. Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation
and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2016).
102. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 83.
104. See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 17, at 586 (noting that capital adequacy standards play a role in
shaping “a market for secured credit in which assets or transactions deemed too risky to serve as eligible credit
protection are instead employed by non-bank institutions”). This tendency might fuel “shadow banking”
activities, intended as credit intermediation activities occurring partially or completely outside the banking
system. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 620–23 (2012)
(offering an analysis of the origins of shadow banking and its regulatory challenges).
105. See Ward, supra note 90, at 414–29 (assessing the use of copyright as collateral under Article 9); Alice
Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1645, 1667–68 (1996) (noting the uncertainties surrounding the use of copyright as collateral); Peter L. Choate,
Belts, Suspenders, and the Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: The Undressing of the Contemporary
Creditor, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1415, 1436–42 (1998) (discussing the anomalies of the perfection regime
governing security interests in copyright).
106. In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 522–23 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997); see In re World Auxiliary
Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2002) (confirming implicitly In re Avalon Software Inc.); see also
Ward, supra note 90, at 414–16, 424–29 (critically analyzing these decisions).
107. See In re Peregrine Ent., Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199–203 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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priority of security interests in unregistered copyright fall within the remit of
Article 9 and its filing system.108 This bifurcation brings with it a range of
difficulties. Most notably, the holder of an unregistered copyright can choose—
at any moment in time—to record it in the Copyright Registry and, thus,
transform it into a registered copyright; however, neither Article 9 nor the
Copyright Act address coherently the impact of this transition regarding security
interests.109 This lacunose CLI concocts a regime in which if an unregistered
copyright is subsequently registered, any security interest previously perfected
under Article 9 in this asset becomes ineffective against third parties.
Consequently, such security interests must be re-perfected pursuant to the rules
of the Copyright Act and will be defeated by a competing claim that has been
recorded in the Copyright registry in the intervening time.110 This coordination
failure renders the use of unregistered copyrights as collateral unappealing for
potential secured creditors, due to being exposed to the risk of losing third party
effectiveness.111 It disincentivizes market participants from entering into secured
transactions involving these assets, producing a chilling effect that ultimately
depresses their value.

II. UNDERSTANDING COORDINATION FAILURES: THE LEGAL THEORY
PERSPECTIVE
Legal scholars, lawmakers, courts, and administrative agencies have long
grappled with gaps and incongruences in the law.112 A vast scholarship has been
devoted to establishing when silence in a legal text can be said to constitute a
gap, and, in turn, to the construction canons, legislative and regulatory
approaches that courts, judges, and administrative agencies should follow when
confronted with such lacunae.113 Incongruences in the law have been the subject
of even greater scrutiny.114 A range of interpretive and rulemaking methods have
been formulated, both to overcome contradictions that emerge within a single

108. See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1131–32; Stacey G. Jernigan, Marty L. Brimmage,
Jr. & Ian T. Peck, The Perfection of Liens in Unregistered Copyrights: Aerocon and Beyond, 28 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 645 passim (2003) (providing an exhaustive analysis of this decision).
109. See Justin M. Vogel, Note, Perfecting Security Interests in Unregistered Copyrights: Preemption of
the Federal Copyright Act and How Filing in Accordance with Article 9 Leads to the Creation of a Bankruptcy
“Force Play”, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 465–73 (2002).
110. See id. at 490–91 (describing perfection of security interests in unregistered copyright as illusory);
Ward, supra note 90, at 428–29 (arguing for legal reform).
111. It should be noted that the coordination failure under consideration does affect a secured creditor’s
claim under Article 9 to any proceeds stemming from the transfer of an encumbered unregistered copyright.
Nevertheless, such proceeds might not always be available, or they might be difficult to trace.
112. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 19; 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note
19, §§ 36–37, 40; BENNION, supra note 19, at 42–49; BARAK, supra note 19, at 66–73; CRAWFORD, supra note
19, at 269; CROSS, supra note 19, at 65–80.
113. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 66–73; CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 269.
114. For the lawmaking perspective, see Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 14; Diver, supra note 14. For
an interpretive perspective, see 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 19, § 37;
BARAK, supra note 19, at 74–80; CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 263–68.
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law,115 and to resolve conflicts between rules and standards stemming from
distinct legal sources.116 Similarly, the extent to which courts may either ignore
or deviate from rules and principles, the application of which would result in
dysfunctional or even absurd outcomes, has been the subject of a vivacious
debate.117
This Part reviews first the extent to which orthodox rulemaking approaches
and hermeneutical canons that focus on consistency are helpful in overcoming
the gaps and incongruences at the heart of CLI coordination failures. Finding
this to be a barren path, we turn to the notion of legal coherence for recourse and
posit that it should be placed at the heart of any method that seeks to overcome
the challenges presented by the convergence of commercial law branches.
A. VENTURING BEYOND LEGAL CONSISTENCY
Gaps and incongruences in the law are problematic for both legal
interpretation and rulemaking. Regarding the former, scholars and lawmakers
have elaborated hermeneutical methods which rely on an array of norms and
conventions to deal with antinomies and lacunae. Grounded in diverse theories,
these interpretation tools offer elastic standards and presumptions through which
substantive meaning is extrapolated from the text, structure, context, subject
matter, and purpose of the law under consideration.118 In the context of
rulemaking, a variety of approaches have been developed to minimize the
occurrence and impact of gaps and incongruences.119 Looking to form, care is
devoted to designing, developing, and compiling drafts the wording and
structure of which facilitates understanding, and, consequently, implementation
and compliance.120 With respect to substance, lawmakers and regulators often
include mechanisms specifically intended to resolve latent antinomies and

115. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 74–75 (offering a comparative overview of the hermeneutical approaches
followed in different jurisdictions); CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 263–64 (examining a range of canons of
interpretation adopted by U.S. courts).
116. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 75–77; CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 264–66.
117. See JONES, supra note 19, § 286 (discussing the limits of the “consequentialist constructions” and
suggesting that their origin can be traced back to the consequential construction); BARAK, supra note 19, at 79–
80; CROSS, supra note 19, at 16 (discussing the “golden rule”); BENNION, supra note 19, at 41–49 (exploring
consequentialist and rectifying constructions).
118. The literature exploring theories of legal interpretation is vast. See POPKIN, supra note 5, ch. 2–3
(providing an exhaustive analysis of theories of interpretation); D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Routledge 2016) (1991) (providing a recent comparative
study of this topic).
119. See generally HELEN XANTHAKI, DRAFTING LEGISLATION: ART AND TECHNOLOGY OF RULES FOR
REGULATION (2014); BENNION, supra note 19; TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (2006); 1 V.C.R.A.C. CRABBE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1993).
120. This point emerges also from the key attributes of rules enucleated by Colin Diver in relation to the
“transparency” of legal rules. See Diver, supra note 14, at 66–79; see also HELEN XANTHAKI, THORNTON’S
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING ch. 9 (Bloomsbury Pro. 5th ed. 2013); XANTHAKI, supra note 119, ch. 3–6; BENNION,
supra note 19, ch. 6.
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lacunae; notably, this is frequently realized through provisions that expressly
enshrine into law well-established hermeneutical canons.121
The notion of consistency is the common denominator underpinning a
broad range of interpretive and rulemaking methods intended to address gaps
and incongruences in the law.122 This notion in law resonates with that
formulated in philosophy of mathematics and logic theory.123 Internal
consistency demands that a system of rules and logical deductions is devoid of
self-contradictions. External consistency requires that the rules and logical
deductions of one system are mutually compatible with those of another.124
Accordingly, hermeneutical canons and rulemaking approaches that focus on
internal consistency target endogenous contradictions and ambiguities within a
single system of rules,125 whereas those that focus on external consistency tackle
gaps and incongruences between distinct systems of rules.126
In addressing CLI coordination failures, the limitations of traditional
methods that focus exclusively on internal consistency are readily apparent.
Branches of commercial law, while increasing in sophistication and expanding
their outreach, have been developed to ensure internal consistency through rules
and logical deductions that are, by design, compatible. Hence, canons of
interpretation aimed at promoting internal consistency are structurally unsuited
to the resolution of coordination failures in CLIs, where compatibility issues
emerge across multiple branches, rather than within a single one.
At first glance, canons of interpretation aimed at ensuring external
consistency between distinct systems of rules might appear as more efficacious
tools in the context of CLIs. Among them, lex specialis and lex superior deserve
special attention. The former establishes that when two laws cover the same
subject matter, the one specifically devoted to the matter under consideration
(lex specialis) should be favored over that with a general remit (lex generalis).127
121. See BENNION, supra note 19, ch. 9. For an example of one such statutory rule designed to resolve
antinomies, see infra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
122. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 61–80; 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra
note 19, §§ 36–37, 40; CRABBE, supra note 119, at 153; Luc J. Wintgens, Legislation as an Object of Study of
Legal Theory: Legisprudence, in LEGISPRUDENCE: A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATION 9, 35–37
(Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2002).
123. In classic deductive logic, consistency implies the lack of contradictions. See ALFRED TARSKI,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC: AND TO THE METHODOLOGY OF DEDUCTIVE SCIENCES 136 (Olaf Helmer trans., Dover
Publ’ns, Inc. 1995) (1941) (“[C]onsistency excludes the possibility that any problem may be decided in two
ways, that is, both affirmatively and negatively . . . .”). Distinction is generally made between internal and
external consistency, as further elaborated in this Part. See infra note 139.
124. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 94–95 (Basic
Books 1999) (1979); Hillel J. Bavli, Applying the Laws of Logic to the Logic of Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
937, 937–39 (2006).
125. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 74–75; CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 263–64.
126. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 75–77; CRAWFORD, supra note 19, at 264–66.
127. The lex specialis canon of construction has deep roots. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS
LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE THREE BOOKS] bk. 2, ch. XVI, sec. XXIX (James Brown Scott
ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1646) (noting that special rules should be favored over
general rules when they are either more closely related to the given subject matter or provide a more effective
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The latter resolves clashes between laws by giving primacy to the one holding
the highest rank within the relevant legal system.128 Neither approach offers a
satisfactory pathway to tackle CLI coordination failures.
With regard to lex specialis, the identification of a special-general
relationship is problematic. In CLIs, the intersecting commercial law branches
are conventionally not in a relationship of subordination; rather they overlap and
engender a new system of rules and principles that governs a determinate
transaction or corporate action.129 Coordination failures stem from gaps and
incongruences between determinate rules, rather than the intersecting branches
in their entirety. Therefore, the special-general relationship is situational and
cannot be determined a priori. For example, financial regulation articulates sets
of rules that govern determinate financial activities, which are concurrently
subject to contract and corporate law. For certain key aspects, such as
shareholders’ voting rights, corporate law is the lex specialis; whereas, financial
regulation is deemed lex generalis. By contrast, in matters concerning the
composition and responsibilities of the board of directors, this special-general
relationship is inverted.
Equally, lex superior supplies imperfect tools to address CLI coordination
failures. Commercial law branches typically exist at the same constitutional
level. Accordingly, in a CLI, it is not possible to give precedence to the rules of
one of the intersecting branches based on their higher authority. Moreover, even
when a legal system does establish that one commercial law branch is
hierarchically superior to another, resolving a CLI on this basis is ineffective if
not outright detrimental. For example, faithful to the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause,130 Article 9 provides that its provisions are preempted by any conflicting
federal law.131 Applying this rule, U.S. courts have held that the federal
Copyright Act regime for “mortgages” and “hypothecations” of registered
copyrights preempts the priority and perfection regime laid out by Article 9 for
general intangibles.132 Thus, this CLI between Article 9 and the Copyright Act
is resolved pursuant to lex superior. Regrettably, such an application of federal
law yields an inefficient regime that suits the needs of neither secured creditors
nor debtors. Under the filing system of the Copyright Act, secured creditors are
legal framework); see also BARAK, supra note 19, at 75; Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a
Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27 (2005); Koskenniemi
Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 56–122 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the lex specialis canon of interpretation
in international law).
128. See 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 19, § 36; BARAK, supra note
19, at 76.
129. A set of rules bound together by interpretative criteria define a self-contained system. See supra Part
I.A.
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The body of scholarship on the Supremacy Clause is immense. See, e.g.,
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 731–34 (2010) (furnishing an
exhaustive bibliography).
131. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that “this article does not apply to the extent that . . . a statute,
regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article.” U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1); see also HARRIS &
MOONEY, supra note 9, at 359–64 (analyzing exhaustively this section and the emerging preemption doctrines).
132. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text; see also Ward, supra note 90, at 420–24.
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required to effectuate discrete filings for every encumbered asset, depositing the
relevant transfer documents and identifying each copyright by its registration
number.133 In National Peregrine, recognizing the undesirable outcome
produced by the lex superior interpretative canon in this CLI, Judge Kozinski
remarked that “filing with the Copyright Office can be much less convenient
than filing under the U.C.C.”134
The preceding discourse shows that a fetishistic pursuit of legal
consistency exacerbates CLI coordination problems. When internal consistency
is taken as the sole criterion for addressing gaps and incongruences, the selfreferential nature of each intersecting branch will be hardened. By perpetuating
inner logics, the autonomous character of each branch will be bolstered.
Applying such an introspective method intensifies coordination failures, rather
than favoring the harmonious coalescence between intersecting branches.135
Coextensively, when external consistency is taken as the sole criterion, one of
the intersecting commercial law branches will be bluntly given primacy over the
others without due regard for the CLI in its entirety. It is highly doubtful that
such a mechanical method will deliver a regime that enables the parties to carry
out effectively the transaction in question according to their idiosyncratic
preferences. These shortcomings suggest that a different, more systematic
method is necessary to navigate safely overlaps of commercial law branches and
resolve their coordination failures. To this end, the notion of legal coherence is
of critical support.
B. LEGAL COHERENCE
The notion of legal coherence has been theorized as a means to redress
ambiguities and conflicts in the law.136 Advocated by some as a panacea and
opposed by others as an undue interference on textual interpretation, its
definition, conceptual perimeter, and applicability have sparked sophisticated

133. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)–(d). These subsections govern the effectiveness against third parties of
copyright transfers. Under subsection 205(d), only a recording “in the manner required to give constructive
notice under subsection (c)” is good against a “later transfer.” Id. § 205(d).
134. In re Peregrine Ent., Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 202 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
135. Internal consistency is a feature that pertains to self-contained and self-referential systems of rules.
Given that self-contained systems reflect sector-specific logics, internal consistency would further reaffirm such
inner logics. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 8, at 1013 (indicating that self-contained regimes are
“structurally coupled with the independent logic of the social sectors [of appurtenance]”). In turn, internal
consistency pertains to self-referentiality because it supports the circular relationship between norms and
decisions. See Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra note 8, at 295 (noting that a particular type of
self-referentiality, termed “autopoiesis,” emerges when decisions to resolve a conflict refer to criteria that are
within such system); see also Koskenniemi Report, supra note 1, ¶ 450 (noting that the pursuit of the consistent
interpretation of one specific treaty might be at the expense of “the consistency of the multilateral treaty system
as a whole”).
136. The body of scholarship exploring the notion of coherence is vast. See, e.g., Hage, supra note 20;
Bertea, supra note 20; Rodriguez-Blanco, supra note 20; Schiavello, supra note 20; Peczenik, supra note 20;
Raz, supra note 20; Hurley, supra note 20; MacCormick, supra note 20; AARNIO, supra note 20; Wintgens,
supra note 122, at 35–38.
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jurisprudential discourse.137 Drawing from such debates and with the aid of legal
theory and philosophy of mathematics, it becomes apparent that coherence is a
composite notion with the following three fundamental traits.
First, in logic, coherence between a plurality of deductive systems requires
that they are both mutually compatible and internally devoid of
contradictions.138 Correspondingly, in law, coherence between a plurality of
systems of rules and principles requires the simultaneous attainment of internal
and external consistency.139 However, internal and external consistency alone
are not sufficient.
Second, for a system to be coherent its rules and logical deductions must
have a “unity of purpose.”140 That is to say that it must “‘hang together’ or to
‘make sense’ as whole.”141 Coherence demands that a system of rules and
principles is woven together on the basis of an ordering criterion. From a
normative standpoint, this entails that the coherence is only possible when a
legal system possesses overarching, guiding purposes towards the realization of
which its rules and principles gravitate. Such overarching, guiding purposes may
be drawn from a broad social, moral, economic, or political spectrum,142
depending on the subject matter in question and the relevant jurisdiction.
Third, absolute coherence is unattainable.143 Both consistency and unity of
purpose can never be achieved perfectly. Regarding consistency, in logic and
legal reasoning alike, it has been long established that a system can never be
truly free of internal ambiguities and conflicts nor can it be complete.144

137. Bertea, supra note 20, at 371–72 (summarizing this debate and noting that “[w]hile there is wide
agreement among contemporary legal theorists on the characterization of coherence in the negative as lack of
inconsistencies, it is still a question how coherence might be defined in positive terms”).
138. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 124, at 94–100 (indicating that external consistency relates to deductions
that are external to the system under consideration and internal consistency relates to the mutual compatibility
of logical deductions within a system). The attainment of internal and external consistency is aspirational rather
than a normative prescription; inconsistency and incompleteness are inherent to logical systems. On the
incompleteness theorem first formulated by Kurt Gödel, see infra note 144.
139. The relation between “total consistency” and “coherence” is central to Ronald Dworkin’s argument
and critique of legal positivism. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 119–27.
140. See MacCormick, supra note 20, at 236 (speaking of unity of principle); Raz, supra note 20, at 284
(speaking of a unified set of principles).
141. MacCormick, supra note 20, at 235.
142. See id. at 238; AARNIO, supra note 20, at 177–80; Schiavello, supra note 20, at 233–37.
143. See Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 20, at 131, 145 (noting a degree of approximation to coherence);
Raz, supra note 20, at 286–87 (noting that absolute coherence is impossible due to the pluralistic principles
underlying all legal systems); MacCormick, supra note 20, at 248–51.
144. In philosophy of mathematics, according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, every system of logical
deductions is necessarily incomplete; attempts to compensate such a condition would require the implementation
of complex reasoning compromising the consistency among the chain of deductions. See KURT GÖDEL, ON
FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (Bernard
Meltzer trans., Basic Books Inc. 1962). The applicability of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to law has sparked
an intriguing debate. For an overview, see Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable
Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439
(1992) (arguing that Gödel’s theorem indicates that law is necessarily incomplete, thus advancing a critique to
legal formalism); see also Bavli, supra note 124, at 938 (indicating that the law itself contains “limitations on
its capacity to realize formal consistency”).
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Similarly, in respect of unity of purpose, it is impossible for the totality of the
rules and principles of a system to all be uniformly and consonantly aligned with
its overarching guiding purposes.145 Accordingly, coherence is scalar rather than
binary in nature; between the most coherent and the most incoherent solutions
there lies a field of intermediate options.
The above lends robust support to the view that a legal method to address
CLI coordination failures should seek legal coherence. Attention should not be
cast towards each intersecting branch discretely. Crucially, the focus should be
on the intersection itself, understood as a system of logical deductions and legal
rules.146 Hence, CLI coordination failures should be confronted with the aim of
ensuring that internal and external consistency are simultaneously attained
through a unity of purpose.147 Given that a CLI arises from the overlap of
different branches that jointly realize a legal regime for determinate transactions,
its purpose is not explicit but must be inferred. This investigation warrants
careful consideration.
C. FINDING PURPOSE
Purpose is an overworked notion in legal theory. Scholars have devoted
copious time and effort defining it, appraising its significance, and theorizing
the approaches by which it should be extrapolated.148 At their core, purposive
methods seek to link a system of rules and logical deductions to its “true
reason”;149 nevertheless, different schools of thought construe this nexus on the
basis of profoundly diverse constituent components and methodologies.150
For the present inquiry, the purpose of a CLI should be understood as a
normative concept which comprises the underlying social and economic policies
and political objectives that this system is designed to attain. Regarding the
sources that should be appraised to infer such purpose, two key issues require
consideration. The first is the relevance that should be attributed to the textual
elements of the CLI in question.

145. See MacCormick, supra note 20, at 245–51; Raz, supra note 20, at 286–87.
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. The significance of unity of purpose has also been recognized in international law. Specifically, it has
been suggested that legal coherence in the “international legal order” should be attained by reference to
established “general principles of law” that “represent a central cohesive force, revealing and reinforcing the
systemic nature of the system” and “operate as a tool for intra-systemic convergence.” Andenas & Chiussi, supra
note 20, at 10–11.
148. The purposive method has deep roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence. See SIR JOHN BAKER, THE
REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA 1216–1616, at 222 (2017) (noting that, by late sixteenth century, it had long
been established that readers in the inns of court had “to begin their exposition of a statute by offering a historical
explanation of the mischief at which it was aimed”); BARAK, supra note 19, at 89; Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 262–65 (1981); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev.
ed. 1969); GIDON GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 105 (1968).
149. This proposition can be traced back to Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7
b (Eng.), in which the English Court of Exchequer interpreted an Henrician statute concerning the dissolution of
monasteries, based on its construction of the “true reason” of this law.
150. See POPKIN, supra note 5, ch. 2–3 (providing a comprehensive historical analysis and an exhaustive
bibliography).
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On this matter, jurisprudence theories addressing “hard cases”—within
which CLIs would typically fall—provide a useful frame of reference.151 Ronald
Dworkin axiomatically posits that textual indications are insufficient and that
recourse to contextual elements outside the semantic datum is necessary.152
Similarly, Lon Fuller argues that textual elements are inherently indeterminate
if examined in isolation, and suggests that an assessment of the context in which
legal rules are intended to operate is always required.153 In like manner, Aharon
Barak argues that the semantic components of a rule only reveal the range of its
possible meanings and suggests that the analysis of extra textual elements is
always necessary.154 Arguably, recourse to contextual elements also finds
support in H.L.A. Hart’s positivist approach, whenever a case falls within the
“cone of penumbra” of the applicable rules and cannot be resolved on the basis
of the plain meaning of the text.155
As CLI coordination failures are caused by gaps and incongruences
between intersecting commercial law branches, it stands to reason that textual
elements will generally be scarce and supply but limited indications. The search
for the guiding purposes instrumental to fostering legal coherence will almost
invariably have to go beyond textual elements and venture into the relevant
context.
Having established that a contextual approach is required to infer the
purpose of a CLI, the second issue concerns the content and boundaries of this
assessment. Looking again at jurisprudence theories as a frame of reference, a
rich plurality of views emerges. Ronald Dworkin broadly suggests that the
relevant context from which purposes should be inferred is the “political
structure” of the relevant community and in particular its principles of political
morality.156 Taking a different approach, Aharon Barak suggests that the context
from which the purpose of a system of rules should be extrapolated is the
combined product of the subjective intent of the legislature and the objective
intent of the legal system in which it operates considered as a whole.157
Regarding CLIs, we submit that the contextual inquiry determinative to the
extrapolation of purpose should focus on the relevant intersecting branches. As
151. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 126 (3d ed. 2012) (expressing the positivist approach to hard cases); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 197 (1979); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957) (criticizing H.L.A. Hart’s dichotomy between standard cases that
do not require a contextual approach and penumbral cases that warrant a broader contextual approach); Max
Radin, Realism in Statutory Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 156 (1935) (expressing the realist
approach to hard cases).
152. See Dworkin, supra note 151, at 1059–60.
153. See Fuller, supra note 151, at 661–70.
154. See BARAK, supra note 19, at 6–7, 120–22, 148–52.
155. See HART, supra note 151, at 123–26.
156. See Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165–67 (1982).
157. See BARAK, supra note 19, at xi, 110, 148 (theorizing that the context from which purpose should be
inferred is expression of the internal relationship between the intent of the specific author (“subjective”) and the
intent of a reasonable author (“objective”); at the highest level of abstraction objective intent is “the intent of the
system” it is “a legal construction that reflects the needs of society. It is an expression of a social ideal”).
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each CLI is a new system of rules and logical deductions that stems from two or
more commercial law branches,158 it follows that these intersecting branches
offer the primary contextual datum. Hence, to identify the socio-economic goals
of the CLI in question, it will be necessary to elicit the purposes of each
intersecting branch. In this respect, it should be noted that some commercial law
branches are characterized by statutes that declare their underlying purposes
explicitly. For example, embodying Karl Llewellyn’s “principle of patent
reason,”159 the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) states that its policies and
underlying purposes are “(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and
(3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”160
In a similar vein, a growing number of regulatory regimes expressly state
their purposes. Typically, this occurs when administrative authorities exercise
their delegated powers to regulate a specific sector of the economy through “new
governance” approaches.161 New governance entails experimental regulatory
structures that are polycentric, as they transcend the public-private divide by
entrusting regulated entities with key regulatory functions. In this schema, the
purpose of a regulatory provision is enunciated in general principles that indicate
the behavior which regulated entities must adopt. Thus, the purpose is an integral
component of principle-based regulation, whereby regulatory outcomes are
expressly declared, while discretion as to the most suitable methods to achieve

158. See supra Part I.B.
159. See WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 321–22 (1973) (citing a
1944 Karl Llewellyn paper stating “[t]he principle of the patent reason: Every provision should show its reason
on its face. Every body of provisions should display on their face their organizing principle”).
160. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019). On the interpretation of the U.C.C., see
generally Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on “Purpose” in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 419 (1997); Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1978); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951).
161. See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The
Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 837–39
(2010) (critically examining the application of new governance approaches in the context of banking regulation);
see also Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD.
L. REV. 1037 (2012) (advancing a critical analysis on the effectiveness of new governance techniques following
the global financial crisis); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (noting the need to redefine the interactions between public and
private actors through regulatory approaches that stimulate the implementation of self-regulatory measures);
Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 273, 285 (2011) (noting the relationship between novel principle-based approaches and “new
governance”); Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 445 (2010) (indicating that new governance approaches are “underpinned by a bottomup, decentered, horizontal experimental process” involving private actors). For an application of new governance
approaches in the context of FinTech, see Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579,
582 (2019) (arguing that some of the new approaches to regulate FinTech are an application of the new
governance methods).
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them is left to financial institutions.162 Differently, “rule-based” approaches163
are concerned with detailing the process that regulated entities must follow to
attain the desired outcomes.164

III. A NOVEL METHOD
The preceding discourse has suggested that the attainment of coherence
within CLIs is instrumental to redressing their coordination failures. This
requires that the relevant rules and principles are consistent with each other and
their appertaining branches, and that such consistency is attained through a set
of guiding purposes inferred from both textual and contextual elements.
This Part articulates a two-step method that incorporates these critical
ingredients and offers the requisite flexibility. It is designed as a normative
blueprint for both interpretive and lawmaking efforts. Regarding the former, it
provides a nuanced hermeneutical tool to deal with gaps and incongruences
stemming from problematic CLIs. Nonetheless, courts and administrative
agencies often have limited maneuvering space and are unable to escape from
the strictures of the textual datum, as exemplified respectively by the decision
in National Peregrine,165 and the intersection between capital adequacy
standards and secured transactions law.166 Hence our method is also intended as
a guide for lawmakers and regulators to avoid CLI coordination failures when
articulating new laws and regulatory regimes or reforming existing ones both
domestically and internationally.
For clarity and simplicity, our analysis below primarily relies on examples
of CLIs that involve two commercial law branches; the additional complexities
generated by the presence of multiple intersecting branches will be highlighted
where appropriate.

162. Principle-based regulation is also referred to as “outcome-based,” or “performance-based,” and is
distinguished from process-orientated regulation; on this distinction, see infra note 164.
163. In finance, principle-based regulation has been heralded as an outcome orientated approach designed
to foster ethical standards in a flexible manner, whereas rule-based regulation has been typically associated with
a narrow mindset of formal compliance. Such a sharp dichotomy has been criticized on different grounds. For
an analysis of the main limits associated to this understanding, see Black, supra note 161, at 1043 (noting that
regulatory regimes necessitate both principles and rules). For further on the connection between principle-based
and rule-based regulation, see Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1426–60 (illustrating how corporate law, securities
regulation, and accounting are necessarily characterized by both general principles and detailed rules).
164. Rule-based regulation is also referred to as “process-oriented,” as the focus is on procedural
requirements; whereas “outcome-oriented” regulation is concerned with benchmarking performance with
regulatory objectives. See Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257, 275 (2010); Cary Coglianese, Performance-Based Regulation: Concepts
and Challenges, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY
PROCESS 403, 410 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016) (indicating that principle-based regulation
might not be always outcome-based regulation as the former has a larger scope).
165. See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 93–104 and accompanying text.
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A. THE FIRST STEP: DECONSTRUCTING THE CONTEXT
The preliminary operation required to address a CLI affected by
coordination failures is to identify which commercial law branches are involved.
The base case will typically feature two branches. For example, a transaction in
which a newly formed corporate entity sells blockchain tokens that are intended
to confer contractually determinate voting and participation rights to their
buyers, produces a CLI between corporate law and financial regulation,
including securities and capital markets law.167 In turn, an agreement to secure
an obligation using such tokens or other digital assets as collateral gives rise to
a CLI between secured transactions law168 and prudential or conduct regulation
regimes.169 In like manner, a transaction in which parties agree to create a
security interest in a pool of copyright licenses, there will be an intersection
between secured transactions law and copyright law.170 More demanding cases
will present CLIs that feature multiple intersecting branches. For example, a
transaction in which a special purpose vehicle acquires a pool of residential
mortgages and concurrently sells securities (for example, mortgage–backed
securities) to investors under which it contractually promises to distribute the
ensuing mortgage payments, forges a CLI amongst corporate law, mortgage law,
secured transactions law, and financial regulation.171 Similarly, a transaction in
167. See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 595–602 (2019) (analyzing exhaustively the technical and legal aspects of “initial coin
offerings”); Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a
Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267, 293–304 (2019)
(expounding the regulatory challenges created by initial coin offerings); Marco Dell’Erba, From Inactivity to
Full Enforcement: The Implementation of the “Do No Harm” Approach in Initial Coin Offerings, 26 MICH.
TECH. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (2020).
168. The secured transactions law regime applicable to the use of blockchain tokens and digital assets as
collateral is the subject of a nascent body of scholarship. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future
of Secured Transactions Law, 3 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 21 (2020); Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin,
52 GA. L. REV. 505 (2018); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the Future,
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2018); Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, A Technological Transformation
of Secured Transactions Law: Visibility, Monitoring, and Enforcement, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 693 (2017); Stephen
McJohn & Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions, 47 UNIF. COM. CODE
L.J. 187, 210 (2017); see also WORLD BANK, supra note 15, at 25–29 (examining the potential impact of
distributed ledger technology on the legal framework of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions).
169. To identify the applicable regulatory regime an investigation on the nature of digital asset under
consideration is required. For instance, if the encumbered digital asset is classified as an investment, a CLI
between secured transactions law and securities law emerges. The problem is more complex if, for instance, if
the encumbered asset is a “stablecoin,” that is, a digital asset backed by traditional assets. In such instances,
depending on the structure, a complex nexus of intersections may arise, involving secured transactions law,
payment system law, AML standards, and prudential requirements to curb credit, market, and operational risk.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 15, at 25–30. On the potential stability concerns and related regulatory responses
for stablecoins with a potential reach across multiple jurisdictions, see generally FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note
73; Arner et al., supra note 73.
170. See Andrea Tosato, Secured Transactions and IP Licenses: Comparative Observations and Reform
Suggestions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 160–72 (2018) (analyzing comparatively the use of IP licenses
as collateral).
171. See Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283,
1295–99 (2012) (providing a general theory on securitization and an exhaustive bibliography); Tracy Lewis &
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which a bank extends a loan secured by all the borrower’s present and future
patents yields a CLI between secured transactions law, patent law, and financial
regulation.172
Once the intersecting commercial law branches have been identified, the
first step of our method involves deconstructing the problematic CLI in question
by bringing into focus both its textual and contextual elements. Regarding the
former, it is necessary to determine precisely which rules and principles give rise
to the coordination failures under consideration. The aim of this investigation is
to chart the perimeter of the CLI and isolate its constituent parts. The resultant
data are pivotal to classifying the coordination failures and appraising their
intensity. For example, in relation to the CLI governing the use of copyright as
collateral, this investigation would delve into both secured transactions and
copyright sources of law to isolate the provisions that have caused coordination
failures.173 Similarly, for the CLI that is formed when a regulated financial
institution takes security in assets other than financial collateral,174 attention
would have to be directed toward the applicable financial regulation and secured
transactions laws to dissect the rules and principles that spawn the
aforementioned incongruous regime.
Regarding the contextual elements, the relationship between the CLI in
question and its constituent commercial law branches needs to be appreciated
systematically. The aim of this assessment is to appraise the importance of the
rules and principles that engender the coordination failure under scrutiny,
relative to their appertaining commercial law branch. For this analysis, we
suggest that each commercial law branch should be viewed as a tripartite
spherical structure formed of a core, a middle sphere, and an outer sphere.175
Every rule and principle involved in the CLI under consideration should be
classified within one of these concentric spheres depending on its systemic
relevance.176 In like manner to the bands in the “coloured spectrum” that appears
when passing white light through a prism,177 the three layers of this
systemization fade into one another, rather than being separated by stark
demarcation lines. Accordingly, there will be borderline cases in which it will
be challenging to establish exactly where a determinate rule falls within this
Alan Schwartz, Unenforceable Securitization Contracts, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 164 (2020) (uncovering a range of
incongruences besetting the overlap that governs securitization contracts involving mortgage backed securities).
172. See Ward, supra note 90, at 429–40 (analyzing the intersection between patent law and Article 9).
173. See id. at 414–29 (analyzing of the intersection between the Copyright Act and Article 9); Haemmerli,
supra note 105, at 1664–68 (emphasizing coordination failures between the Copyright Act and Article 9);
Andrea Tosato, Security Interests over Intellectual Property, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 93, 94–101 (2011)
(analyzing this intersection under English law).
174. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Figure 1.
176. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
177. Between 1666 and 1672, Isaac Newton conducted experiments to study reflections, refractions,
inflexions and colors of light. He observed that that white light (sunlight) passed through a prism separated into
its component colors (dispersion) and formed a “coloured spectrum.” See ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICKS: OR, A
TREATISE OF THE REFLEXIONS, REFRACTIONS, INFLEXIONS AND COLOURS OF LIGHT bk. I, pt. I, prop. II., theor.
II, exper. 3 (London, Smith & Walford 1704).
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spherical structure. Nevertheless, this tripartition is a valuable analytical tool, as
it provides a useful framework by which the causative factors of a CLI
coordination failure can be contextualized within their commercial law branch.
Below we explore in detail the core, the middle sphere, and the outer sphere.
FIGURE 1. COMMERCIAL LAW BRANCHES, CONCENTRIC SPHERES DIAGRAM

1. The Core: Policy Aims
In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the core is
the nucleus encircled by the middle and outer sphere. It comprises the purposes
pursued by a commercial law branch, intended as its underlying social and
economic policies and political objectives. These “policy aims”178 serve as the
foundations of their system of appurtenance. They formulate the ordering
criteria and shape the development of each commercial law branch. These policy
aims may be extrapolated from a range of diverse sources. In some cases, they
are enshrined in statutes;179 in others, they are embedded in regulatory
principles;180 in others still, they emerge from the case law.181 Notably, policy

178. Throughout Part III the locution “policy aims” is used to indicate the underlying social and economic
policies and political objectives. Policy aims, in fact, are key to infer the purpose of a commercial law branch.
See supra Part II.C.
179. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 160–161.
181. See infra notes 206, 211 for examples of U.S. cases articulating the policy aims of copyright, patent,
and trademark law respectively.
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aims are not immutable and can evolve over time; any such changes will be
reflected in the aforementioned textual and contextual elements.
In secured transactions law, this core has been studied extensively.
Pioneered by Article 9 and increasingly embraced both domestically and
internationally,182 the “first principle” of secured transactions law is to enable
debtors “to secure as much or as little of their debts with as much or as little of
their existing and future property as they deem appropriate.”183 This axiom
embodies a bundle of policy aims which are closely linked and mutually
reinforcing. From a private law perspective, it is widely accepted that secured
transactions law should recognize and honor a person’s liberty to use their
personal property as collateral, consistently with the normative values of
freedom of contract and free alienation of property.184 As security interests are
a type of property right, debtors who grant security interests to their creditors are
voluntarily disposing of their property; the law should uphold and respect such
choices, both between the parties and erga omnes, albeit subject to appropriate
limitations.185
From an economic perspective, the prevailing view is that secured
transactions law should aim to incentivize the extension of credit.186 Security
interests are risk mitigation devices instrumental to unlocking financing that
would be unavailable on an unsecured basis.187 They afford lenders an
alternative avenue to satisfy their obligations, in the event of their debtor’s
default. Even when not Pareto efficient188—typically due to non-consensual
transfers of wealth from unsecured to secured creditors—the additional capital
flows generated by secured loans deliver welfare gains that in aggregate

182. See Castellano & Tosato, supra note 39; Anna Veneziano, Italian Secured Transactions Law: The Need
for Reform, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at
355; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell & Feliu Rey, supra note 39; Fernando D. Hernández, Secured Credits in
Insolvency Proceedings in Argentina, 9 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 21 (2015); Neil B. Cohen,
Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173 (1998).
183. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking
Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2021–22 (1994). See generally GILMORE, supra note 37.
184. Harris & Mooney, supra note 183, at 2047–53. The authors—who served as Reporters for the Drafting
Committee to Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9—declare that they “embrace the baseline principles
that underlie current law insofar as it generally respects the free and effective alienation of property rights and
the ability of parties to enter into enforceable contracts. We believe that these principles reflect widely shared
normative views that favor party autonomy concerning both property and contract.” Id.
185. See id. at 2047–66 (arguing forcefully in support of this thesis).
186. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 1.1–1.2 (9th ed. 2014).
187. See Giuliano G. Castellano, Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy?,
78 MOD. L. REV. 611, 617 (2015) (noting that one of the primary economic functions of security interests in
personal property is to allow lenders to “manage and mitigate credit risk”).
188. In economic theory, “an allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no feasible reallocation that can raise
the welfare of one economic agent without lowering the welfare of some other economic agent. The concept of
Pareto efficiency can be applied to any economic allocation whether it emerges from trade, bargaining, strategic
interaction, or government imposition.” Pareto Efficiency, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Black,
Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles eds., 2009). This notion was first theorized by the Italian economist Vilfredo
Pareto (1848–1923).
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outweigh the social costs of these dealings.189 From a social perspective, there
is growing recognition that secured transactions law should aim to bolster
financial inclusion.190 To this end, the legal framework governing secured
lending should be designed to empower SMEs and underserved constituencies,
whose ingenuity and entrepreneurship have traditionally been stifled by the
unavailability of affordable capital.191
In financial regulation, the overarching purpose is to ensure that the
financial system performs its primary function of allocating and deploying
economic resources across industries, market participants, and over time.192
Crucially, markets are not perfect. Their competitive dynamics do not always
yield desirable and efficient allocation of economic resources. These
malfunctions are commonly referred to as “market failures” and represent one
of the primary justifications for public (regulatory) interventions in the financial
system.193 According to this understanding, financial regulation should pursue
189. Law and economics literature exploring secured transactions law is vast. See, e.g., Brian M. McCall,
It’s Just Secured Credit! The Natural Law Case in Defense of Some Forms of Secured Credit, 43 IND. L. REV.
7, 9–12 (2009) (providing an exhaustive bibliography); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1469 (1986) (submitting that secured credit lowers screening costs and that debtors are best placed
to determine when giving security maximizes value); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 678–79 (1992) (positing that secured credit avoids “duplicative
monitoring of . . . creditor misbehavior”); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L.
REV. 2179, 2213 (1994) (asserting that “security interests disable the borrower from personal misbehavior”);
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2114–21 (1994)
(advancing the idea that Article 9 priority rules efficiently address risk alteration and incentivize late-in-time
marginal borrowing). Notably, the view that secured credit is efficient is not unanimously accepted. See, e.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy:
Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1315–18 (1997); Elizabeth Warren, Making
Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1997);
John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47, 48–52 (1995); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1913–14 (1994); Paul M. Shupack, Defining
Purchase Money Collateral, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 767, 773–79 (1992).
190. See WB KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 9; Giuliano Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Global
Regulatory Standards and Secured Transactions Law Reforms: At the Crossroad Between Access to Credit and
Financial Stability, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/
2018/05/global-regulatory-standards-and-secured-transactions-law-reforms.
191. See SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND ACCESS TO CREDIT (Frederique Dahan & John Simpson
eds., 2008) (exploring the nexus between secured transactions law and access to credit); WB KNOWLEDGE
GUIDE, supra note 12, at 4 (emphasizing the importance of inclusive access to credit as a core policy aim of
secured transactions law); Walsh, supra note 17, at 181–82; Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article
of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29–32 (1951); Louise Gullifer & Ignacio Tirado, A
Global Tug of War: A Topography of Micro-Business Financing, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113–16
(2018); Steven L. Schwarcz, Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into Collateralized Credit, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2019).
192. See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial
Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 5 (Dwight B. Crane,
Kennenth A. Froot, Scott P. Mason, André F. Perold, Robert C. Merton, Zvi Bodie, Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano
eds., 1995) (indicating that the overarching socio-economic function of allocating economic resources across
borders and time is realized through a sub-set of functions, including the clearing and settling of payments, the
management of risks, and the deployment of capital).
193. Although other reasons, such as social solidarity, lend strong support to the implementation of
regulatory policies, the market failures rationale—deploying the analytical tools of economics—is commonly
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public interests (public interest theories),194 rather than being solely molded by
the interests of individuals, groups, and industries (interest group theories).195
Through this lens, this commercial law branch provides a set of rules and
principles that instill confidence in the financial system by addressing market
failures. In turn, this incentivizes market participants to deploy their capital,
supplying both short-term liquidity and long-term financing to the “real
economy.”196 To this end, regulation should be designed to achieve two broad
policy aims. First, regulatory regimes should protect the integrity of financial
markets, ensuring that they operate in a fair and efficient manner.197 This policy
aim entails the safeguarding of professional and retail investors as well as
savers,198 and ramifies into the variety of regimes pertaining to conduct
considered as the main reasons justifying the regulation of financial markets. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note
76, at 51 (noting that the key “features of financial markets make them . . . prone to malfunction”); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 818 (2012)
(arguing that four types of market failures are inherent in the financial system and identifying them as
“information failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure”).
194. Public interest theories have developed around the notion that regulators are benevolent agents and that
the purpose of regulation is to attain publicly desired outcomes. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990) (advocating for regulation to embrace further
this understanding and promote public interests). Adopting a public interest approach to identify the purposes of
financial regulation does not imply that regulation could be influenced by other factors, such as lobbying from
interests groups or behavioral dynamics. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Geneviève Helleringer, The Social
Psychology of Financial Regulatory Governance, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 160
(Emilios Avgouleas & David C. Donald eds., 2019) (advancing a theory to explain how group dynamics can
impact the collective decision-making process of regulatory agencies).
195. Interest group theories develop around the notion that individuals, such as market participants,
regulators, or politicians, maximize their own interests. Hence, parties involved in the regulatory process seek
to maximize their own utility. See Sam Peltzman, Toward A More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211, 214–27 (1976) (identifying the key assumptions to explain the regulatory process); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–6 (1971) (advancing the idea that
regulation is “captured” by regulated entities as they contribute to its design and interpretation for their own
benefit).
196. The term “real economy” refers to that segment of the economic system concerned with the production
of goods and supply of services. Real Economy, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/real-economy (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
197. Market integrity, like financial stability, is an elusive concept that has witnessed a significant expansion
in recent years. In general, behaviors that give rise to market integrity concerns encompass a variety of actions
that may compromise the efficient functioning of financial markets, undermining the confidence of investors.
See Janet Austin, What Exactly Is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of the Core Objectives of Securities
Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215 (2017) (noting the connection between market integrity and
fairness in the context of securities regulation); Harry McVea, Supporting Market Integrity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 55, at 631, 634–35 (identifying the activities that threat
market integrity and pose relevant regulatory challenges).
198. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2018)
(enumerating consumer protection among its central objectives). Some commentators consider the protection of
retail customers as a policy objective with a separate standing. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer
Payne, Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 55, at 1, 6. However,
the protection of customers, including investors in the retail segment of financial markets, is ultimately a matter
of market integrity. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 13
(1976) (noting that misconduct “prevents capital suppliers [such as depositors, investors, shareholders] from
knowing fully the risks actually posed by a firm, and thus may prevent markets from working perfectly”). In
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regulation.199 Second, financial regulation should be concerned with
maintaining the safety of financial institutions and the stability of the financial
system considered in its entirety.200 The former aim should be achieved through
micro-prudential regulation;201 the latter, instead, should be attained through
macro-prudential regulatory policies.202
The debate regarding the policy aims of IP law has burned passionately for
centuries.203 For copyright, one long-held view has contended that this
commercial law branch is designed to grant authors absolute control over their
creations because they are figments of their “personality” (personhood
theory).204 A different thesis has posited that the policy aim of copyright is to
afford authors the just reward for their creative labor (Lockean labor theory).205
A third view, of ever greater prevalence, is that the policy aim of copyright is to
offer market-driven incentives to stimulate the ingenuity of authors, as the
proliferation of creative works augments social welfare (utilitarian theory).206
2018, the Department of Justice established the Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud, with the
purpose of “combating fraud against consumers . . . and corporate fraud that victimizes the general public and
the government.” Press Release, Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Deputy Attorney General
Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks Announcing the Establishment of the Task Force on Market Integrity and
Consumer Fraud (July 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosensteindelivers-remarks-announcing-establishment-task.
199. For a definition of conduct regulation and its relationship with “compliance culture,” see supra notes
55–56 and accompanying text.
200. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322
(establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to maintain the stability of the U.S. financial
system). See supra note 58 and accompanying treatise in text for the definition of macro-prudential regulation.
Albeit commonly recognized as one of the central policy aims of financial regulation, financial stability is an
elusive notion better understood as a condition where instability is absent. See William A. Allen & Geoffrey
Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 152 (2006) (noting that financial stability
is a state where episodes of instability are less likely to occur). Hence, the maintenance of financial stability
results in limiting the occurrence and impact of systemic risk, defined as “a risk of disruption to financial services
that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious
negative consequences for the real economy.” IMF, Bank for Int’l Settlements & Fin. Stability Bd., Guidance
to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations,
Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 2 (Oct. 2009). For the regulatory approaches
to systemic risk, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
202. On the distinction between micro- and macro-prudential regulation, see supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
203. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6–10 (2011) (providing a rich
bibliography and a broad overview of the scholarly debate on the nature and justifications of intellectual property
law); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (giving an exhaustive
account of the theories underlying IP law).
204. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1041,
1045–55 (2019) (explaining the philosophical roots of this theory and its application to copyright law theory);
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 81, 87–88 (1998) (analyzing this theory).
205. See Hughes, supra note 203, at 296–310 (analyzing Locke’s property theory and its application to
copyright law); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–55 (1993).
206. Unequivocal proclamations are found in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
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For patent law, utilitarian theories have inexorably garnered the favor of
lawmakers, scholars, and judges. Proponents of this view suggest that the aim of
this IP law strand is to stimulate and reward the development, realization, and
marketing of inventions for the economic and societal welfare that they
generate.207 Other theoretical justifications based on natural rights,208 prospect
theory,209 and social justice,210 have not gained comparable traction. Looking to
trademarks law, in the nineteenth century, the generally accepted view held that
this system of rules and principles was devised to safeguard producers from
competitors’ attempts to misappropriate their clientele with confusing and
deceptive trade signs. In the twentieth and twenty-first century, lawmakers,
courts, and commentators have progressively shifted to a utilitarian stance. They
have embraced the theory that the policy aim of trademarks law should be to
enhance the quality of information available to market participants, thereby
reducing search costs and increasing both competition and efficiency.211
2.

The Middle Sphere: Key Tenets

In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the middle
sphere exists between the core and the outer spheres. It comprises the dispositive
rules and principles that articulate the legal framework necessary to realize the
policy aims of a commercial law branch. These “key tenets”212 are generally
embedded in statutory instruments but can also stem from case law. Though with

(1954); and Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834). See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009) (providing an exhaustive analysis); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
207. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (embracing an utilitarian theory of
patent law); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 993–94 (1997) (providing a detailed explanation and an exhaustive bibliography); Alan Devlin &
Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 897, 897–99 (2009); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 181–84 (2009). Famously, Abraham Lincoln
described the U.S. Patent system as adding “the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.” Abraham Lincoln, Second
Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
208. See Mossoff, supra note 43, at 1313–15.
209. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71
(1977).
210. See Peter S. Menell, Property, Intellectual Property, and Social Justice: Mapping the Next Frontier, 5
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 147, 186–95 (2016).
211. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating that trademark law
reduces the customers’ costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, while assuring producers
reputational rewards associated with a strong brand); Union Nat’l Bank v. Union Nat’l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 844
(5th Cir. 1990) (stating that trademarks lower consumer search costs, foster high quality production and impede
free-riding); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM.
ST. U. L. REV. 199, 214–17 (1991); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law
Articles and Reports, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270–72 (1988).
212. Throughout Part III the locution “key tenets” is used to indicate the rules and principles that fall within
the middle sphere of a commercial law branch.
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different intensity, they typically possess three traits that are interconnected and
mutually influencing.
First, key tenets establish the rules and principles through which
commercial law branches supplement or derogate general law or another
commercial law branch.213 In the context of banking law and regulation, for
instance, key tenets of prudential regimes are constructed upon legal rules
defining the relationship between depositors and the banker. As originally
recognized by English common law and further elaborated upon by a rich
jurisprudence developed by the U.S. Supreme Court,214 deposits are “nothing
more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor,”215 forming
a contractual relationship that allows banks to deploy such deposits to conduct
their business and earn profits.216 This legal characterization allows banks to
perform their socio-economic function within the financial system.217
Coextensively, courts have long acknowledged that banking differs substantially
from an “ordinary private business” because of its “public nature” which, in turn,
demands that it be “properly subject to the police power of the state.”218 By
holding a portion of the capital raised and converting most into means of
production,219 banks deploy deposits (liquid debts with no fixed maturity) to
support the creation of loans (illiquid assets with long-term maturity).220 Yet,
unlike other debtor-creditor relationships, the power to receive deposits and
extend loans is conferred by a special set of rules, such as those set out for
federally chartered banks.221
In this schema, a principal-agent problem surfaces, whereby the banker
(agent) tends to maximize returns from investing the money of depositors
213. See supra Part I.A.
214. In Foley v. Hill, Lord Cottenham delivered what could arguably be considered one of the most quoted
decisions in banking law and stated that: “The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and
purposes, the money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases . . . he is of course answerable for the amount . . . to
repay to the principal, when demanded, a sum equivalent to that paid into his hands.” Foley v. Hill (1848) 2
HLC 28, 36–37 (Eng.); see CRANSTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 192 (noting that “the excessive attention given
to the debtor-creditor side of Foley v. Hill obscures the fact that the case had an important contractual basis” to
explain why the depositor-banker relationship presents significant deviations from the traditional debt
obligations). The contractual nature of the relationship emerges more clearly from U.S. case law. See supra note
211 and accompanying text.
215. Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995).
216. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) (“The relationship of bank and depositor is
that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract.”); Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 466 (2016) (“When
a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds and consequently has the right
to use the funds as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits . . . .”).
217. See generally Merton & Bodie, supra note 192 (discussing core functions of the financial system).
218. Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911).
219. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 59, at 66–67; ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 76, at 277.
220. From an aggregate perspective, each time a loan is extended, a corresponding deposit is created;
therefore, loans generate deposits that, in turn, are the primary form of purchasing power. See Castellano &
Dubovec, supra note 1, at 70 (indicating that liquidity and maturity transformation are key functions to support
the creation of credit and purchasing power in the modern economic system). For the function of deposits as a
particular form of debt, see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 59, at 67.
221. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) (explaining that traditional banking powers also include
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, and “loaning money on personal security”).
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(principals) in order to increase its own profits.222 Corporate structures and
compensation mechanisms may incentivize this behavior, leading bankers to
take excessive risk or disfavoring prudent risk-management.223 As depositors are
exposed to potential losses without having the power to monitor the conduct of
the banker, a problem of moral hazard emerges.224 To maximize the value of the
firm, bank managers and shareholders are incentivized to take more risk than
what would be optimal from the standpoint of social welfare and, thus,
compromising safety and soundness aims.225 The key tenets of prudential
regulation are thus designed to redress the misalignment of incentives between
bankers and depositors. They depart from general rules, for instance, by
introducing the principle of “stakeholders’ supremacy,”226 by indicating that
remuneration structures should support sound risk-management,227 or by
establishing coefficients and formulae to determine the amount of own funds
that a bank must maintain for each given risk exposure.228 The resulting
222. On the principal-agent problem in general, see the seminal work, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).
223. Mechanisms to compensate managers for short-term results are typically considered to heighten the
principal-agent problem. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010). The debate is particularly lively in the context of bonuses accorded to managers. See
Andreas Kokkinis, Exploring the Effects of the ‘Bonus Cap’ Rule: The Impact of Remuneration Structure on
Risk-Taking by Bank Managers, 19 J. CORP. L. STUD. 167 (2019) (providing an exhaustive analysis of the
problem and its regulatory approaches).
224. In economic theory, moral hazard is inherent to principal-agent relationships and it is defined as a
problem of “hidden action,” given that the action of the agent cannot be observed and contracted upon by the
principal. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) (“The source
of this moral hazard . . . is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results because individual
actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon.”).
225. On the threats that governance mechanisms might pose to the safety and soundness of firms and
markets, see John Thanassoulis & Misa Tanaka, Bankers’ Pay and Excessive Risk 1 (Bank of Eng., Staff
Working Paper No. 558, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674040; Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, Excessive
Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship, 21 COLUM.
J. EUROPEAN L. 1, 2–6 (2015) (highlighting the connection between bank’s corporate governance, managers’
compensation mechanisms, and financial stability).
226. For financial firms, the principle of “shareholders’ supremacy”—arguably, a key tenet of corporate
law—is often superseded by the principle of “stakeholders’ supremacy.” In banking, this principle is enshrined
in international standards. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (BCBS), BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 3 (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d328.pdf (“[W]ith respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors’
interest.”). Notably, in some jurisdictions, this normative shift from shareholders’ supremacy to stakeholders’
supremacy has started to reflow from financial regulation into corporate law. See David Kershaw & Edmund
Schuster, The Purposive Transformation of Company Law, 68 AM. J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363267 (analyzing recent U.K. company law reforms and
suggesting that these interventions both facilitate the emergence of “purposeful companies” and enable “a
reordering of corporate priorities, away from an immediate and ever-present priority for shareholders and
(variably) towards employees, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders”).
227. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 30.16(b)(1) (2019) (limiting the compensation attributed to executives, and other
highly paid persons, of firms that received public assistance). For a comparative analysis of different regulatory
approaches, see Kokkinis, supra note 223.
228. For key function of capital requirements, see Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71 (“[C]apital
requirements control the quantity of credit circulating in the economy by binding its creation to an amount of
equity that is proportionate to the level of risk acquired by each bank.”). For a detailed analysis of these
mechanisms, see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 59, at 238–59.
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regulatory framework supplements contract and corporate law rules, stemming
from common law tradition,229 to address moral hazard, by ensuring that banks
have some “skin in the game,”230 and achieve stated policy aims.
The second trait, closely linked to the first, is that key tenets articulate the
fundamental concepts and doctrines of their appertaining system. For example,
in secured transactions law, they govern the central aspects of creation,
perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests. Regarding the former,
under Article 9, one such key tenet postulates that a person may create a security
interest that encumbers one or all their present and future assets (floating lien),231
and secures any or all present or future obligations owed to a creditor.232
Similarly, across IP laws, key tenets dictate the cardinal elements of the legal
framework governing subject matter, protection requirements, scope of
protection, alienability, and enforcement. For example, key tenets of the Lanham
Act provide that trademarks holders have the exclusive right to “use in
commerce” their registered “mark” and censure any person who causes a
likelihood of confusion,233 dilution,234 cybersquats,235 or engages in false
advertising.236
The third trait is that key tenets are typically expressed at a high level of
generality and abstraction. Notable examples are: the general obligation to
perform and enforce contracts in good faith established by the U.C.C.,237 the
“rule of reason” in antitrust law,238 the requirement that “works of authorship”239
must be original240 to be protected by copyright, and the obligations of financial

229. See DALVINDER SINGH, BANKING REGULATION OF UK AND US FINANCIAL MARKETS 83–84 (2007)
(noting that the common law position on the relationship between a bank and its customers establishes a scant
protection for depositors, thus offering solid justification for the establishment of a regulatory framework).
230. Prudential regimes are designed both to limit excessive risk-taking and to enhance the loss-absorption
capacity of banks. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 76, at 290–315; SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 59, at 504–
74.
231. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020); see also HARRIS & MOONEY, supra
note 9, at 39–43.
232. U.C.C. § 9-204(c); see also GILMORE, supra note 37, at 917–18.
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
234. See id. § 1125(c).
235. See id. § 1125(d).
236. See id. § 1125(a)(1).
237. U.C.C. § 1-304; see also ROBERT S. SUMMERS, The Conceptualization of Good Faith in American
Contract Law, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 299 (2000) (providing an extensive bibliography); Andrea Tosato,
Commercial Agency and the Duty to Act in Good Faith, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (2016) (providing an
E.U. law perspective).
238. The antitrust body of scholarship on the rule of reason is vast. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of
Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81 (2018) (providing an exhaustive analysis).
239. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8 only mentions “writings,” yet this word has been given
a broad interpretation. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (exploring the notion of “writings”
and stating they “may be liberally construed”); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (stating that
“writings” may include “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor”).
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 566 (suggesting originality is the very premise of
copyright law); Menell, supra note 210, at 174–75.
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immediacies to act in the “best interest of clients.”241 This “vague” and “opentextured” nature is instrumental to the function that key tenets have within
commercial law branches and in their dialogue with policy aims and operative
propositions.242 As observed by Timothy Endicott and Michael Spence, this:
(i) allows the application of the standard to correspond to its purpose, without
the arbitrariness of precision,
(ii) enables the regulation of activities that simply cannot be regulated with
precision, and
(iii) can be a useful technique for allocating decision-making power and
encouraging forms of private ordering that promote the purposes of the law.243

3.

The Outer Sphere: Operative Propositions

In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the outer
sphere encircles the middle sphere and forms the outmost layer of the entire
structure. It comprises rules and principles that build upon the concepts and
doctrines forged by the underlying key tenets. Albeit in varying measure, these
“operative propositions”244 have a narrow scope and govern their subject matter
with a high level of determinacy. They are generally enshrined in statutory
instruments and delegated administrative enactments but can also stem from
judicial decisions. This outer sphere is residual in nature, containing all the rules
and principles of a commercial law branch that fall neither in the core nor in the
middle sphere.

241. The duty of acting in the best interest of clients has been traditionally defined in the context of
investment-advisory relationships. See SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963). For a
cogent analysis, see Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2011) (noting that “the SEC and the courts have constructed a towering
regulatory edifice” to establish fiduciary duties on advisers). Internationally, the duty to pursue the best interest
of clients is enshrined in Principle 2 of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). See
Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns [IOSCO], International Conduct of Business Principles (1990),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD8.pdf; Luca Enriques & Matteo Gargantini, The
Expanding Boundaries of MiFID’s Duty to Act in the Client’s Best Interest: The Italian Case, 3 ITALIAN L.J.
485, 486–88 (2017) (noting that the duty to act in the best interest of clients originated in the United Kingdom
and only subsequently was absorbed in the IOSCO principles and in the European Union). For a comparative
perspective on the fiduciary duties in the banking sector, see Ruth Plato-Shinar, Law and Ethics: The Bank’s
Fiduciary Duty Towards Retail Customers, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND ETHICS IN BANKING AND
FINANCE 214 (Costanza A. Russo, Rosa M. Lastra & William Blair eds., 2019) (indicating the need for
expanding existing regimes to impose fiduciary duties towards banks’ retail clients); Geneviève Helleringer &
Christina Skinner, Conflict of Interests: Comparing Compliance and Culture in the United States and the United
Kingdom, in GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 489, 493–96 (Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini & Gerard
van Solinge eds., 2019) (highlighting that, both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, fiduciary duty
laws perform fundamental regulatory functions).
242. See Diver, supra note 14; Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 856 (noting that a principle-based
approach “leads policymakers to assess their decisions against a set of design criteria that form the basis of
reaching preferred policy outcomes”).
243. Timothy Endicott & Michael J. Spence, Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121 L.Q. REV. 657, 665
(2005).
244. Throughout Part III the locution “operative proposition” is used to indicate the rules and principles that
fall within the outer sphere of a commercial law branch.
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The legal regime governing transfers of patents offers an illustrative
example of both the nature of operative propositions and their dialogue with key
tenets. Under the Patents Act, key tenets state that “patents shall have the
attributes of personal property” and expressly recognize that they can be
assigned, licensed, and mortgaged; moreover, they also state that third party
effectiveness of such transactions is conditional on their recordation in the
special registry held by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office (patent
registry).245 Operative provisions flesh out the framework articulated by these
key tenets, by establishing form requirements for these dealings, default and
mandatary rules affecting their substance, and a public notice regime for their
third party effectiveness. Specifically, operative provisions in the Patent Act
provide that alienations must be in writing and signed; furthermore, they specify
which information needs to be recorded in the patents registry and the process
that must be followed.246
Similarly, in financial regulation, an example of operative provisions in the
outer sphere is furnished by the rules that have a direct applicability in the
compliance framework of financial institutions. Know Your Customer (KYC)
rules—requiring financial institutions to collect, monitor, audit, and analyze
relevant information about customers and potential customers—offer a good
illustration of the mechanics characterizing operative propositions. In their
insistence that firms perform due diligence on their clients, KYC requirements
are essential to the realization of market integrity objectives.247 Together with
the customer due diligence regime (CDD),248 they define a rule-based regime
regulating the processes that financial intermediaries must follow to pursue the
best interest of their clients (key tenet) and, thus, instill confidence in the
financial system (policy aim).

245. 35 U.S.C § 261.
246. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 3.11–3.28 (2019).
247. KYC is designed to prevent that the proceedings deriving from illicit activities channeled into the
financial system. See, for example, the requirement to verify the identity of account holders in the Patriot Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326, 115 Stat 272, 298–320 (2001) and the reporting requirements established with the
Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-4 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). For an overview of KYC rules in the United States, see Genci Bilali, Know
Your Customer–Or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 319, 325–26 (2012) (noting how the need to codify KYC rules
became more urgent to address emerging societal concerns, such as drug trafficking and terrorist activities). At
the international level, see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 14–15
(2020), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%
202012.pdf (proposing Recommendation 10, in particular, on customers’ due diligence).
248. Financial institutions are required to “understand the nature and purpose of the customer relationship
in order to develop a customer risk profile,” in addition to performing “ongoing monitoring for the purpose of
identifying and reporting suspicious transactions.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC), Financial Institution Letter,
Bank Secrecy Act: Customer Due Diligence and Beneficial Ownership Examination Procedures 2 (May 11,
2018), https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2018/fil18026.pdf. The juxtaposition of antimoney laundering and risk-management goals indicates that regulators tend towards a broader understanding of
KYC rules, albeit commentators prefer to consider CDD a distinct set of rules. See, e.g., SCOTT & GELPERN,
supra note 59, at 1262–64.
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B. THE SECOND STEP: FOSTERING LEGAL COHERENCE
Our suggested systemization of commercial law branches has shown that
CLIs can be viewed as the junctures at which the spheres of intersecting
commercial law branches come into contact. Observed in this light, coordination
failures are the result of gaps and incongruences between policy aims, key tenets,
and operative propositions belonging to different commercial law branches.
Equipped with this understanding, the second step of our method turns its
attention to fostering legal coherence.
Below we divide CLI coordination failures into two broad categories. The
differentiating factor is whether or not a core sphere is involved. This division
reflects our view that the path to legal coherence—in terms of the assessments
to be conducted, the considerations to be pondered, and the range of possible
solutions to be adopted—varies markedly if the CLI coordination failure in
question implicates the policy aims of one of the intersecting branches.
1. Coordination Failures Involving Policy Aims
The first category comprises coordination failures that involve policy aims.
There are two types of such failures: “multi-core” and “single-core.”
Multi-core CLI coordination failures are characterized by gaps or
incongruences that stem from tension between the core spheres of two or more
of the converging branches. Though it is unlikely that commercial law branches
with fundamentally conflicting policy aims will develop and co-exist within a
single legal order, frictions may arise within circumscribed facets of their scope
of application.
One such example is provided by the overlap of antitrust law and insurance
law in the ambit of disaster risk financing.249 Specifically, co-insurance
arrangements may generate tensions between the socio-economic policy aim to
expand the capacity of private insurers to absorb losses generated by large-scale
hazards, and that of antitrust law to protect competition by preventing
unreasonable restraints of trade.250

249. Disaster risk financing encompasses a variety of risk-sharing arrangements involving public
institutions and private (non-state) actors, including and in particular financial institutions. For an overview of
these arrangements in the context of catastrophic losses that are generate by natural hazards, see Giuliano
Castellano, Governing Ignorance: Emerging Catastrophic Risks—Industry Responses and Policy Frictions, 35
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.: ISSUES & PRAC. 391 (2010); Alberto Monti, Climate Change and WeatherRelated Disasters: What Role for Insurance, Reinsurance and Financial Sectors, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENV’T
L. & POL’Y 151 (2009).
250. The problem affects different jurisdictions in different ways. See Castellano, supra note 249, at 408–
10 (noting that a strict application of antitrust law might block the development of a market for first-party
property insurance covering disaster risks). In the United States, McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 reserves
regulation of insurance business to the states, thus largely exempting the insurance industry from federal antitrust
law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015. However, incongruences between the due regulatory system and disaster risk
financing remain. See Christopher C. French, Dual Regulation of Insurance, 64 VILL. L. REV. 25, 65–66 (2019)
(noting, for instance, that states cannot impose specific coverages, including those for “natural disasters”).
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When faced with CLI coordination failures of this nature, fostering legal
coherence will require particularly delicate interventions. There are in fact two
possible scenarios that may materialize.
In the first, grievances between the core spheres of two or more intersecting
branches will be symptomatic of an overt incompatibility of their underpinning
social, economic, and political objectives. Here, the path to legal coherence will
necessitate a prioritization of the policy aims of one branch over those of
another. Such policy trade-offs are commonplace in a variety of domains.
Administrative agencies are often mandated to balance competing objectives;251
in the context of financial regulation, this is frequently necessary when stability,
competitiveness,252 and innovation253 are pursued simultaneously. The crucial
normative decision will be to determine precisely the extent to which certain
policy aims should be favored over others. For this assessment, recourse to
technical factors, cost-benefit analyses, risk-assessments, or broader
considerations regarding societal preferences will be inevitable.
In the second scenario, discord amid the core spheres of intersecting
branches in question will not be the product of overt incompatibility of their
underpinning social, economic, and political objectives. In such instances, legal
coherence will call for interventions that mitigate and de-escalate frictions, while
maintaining equilibrium and alignment amongst the underlying policy aims of
the commercial law branches involved.254
Single-core CLI coordination failures are conceptually less challenging
than multi-core ones. They are characterized by gaps or incongruences that stem
from tension between the policy aims of one commercial law branch and the key
tenets or the operative provisions of another. When grappling with such CLI
coordination failures, two elements identified in our preceding analysis should
be borne in mind. First, the purpose of a CLI is a function of the core of each
one of the intersecting branches.255 Second, policy aims have the utmost
systemic relevance in shaping their appertaining commercial law branch.256
Accordingly, if the policy aims of one commercial law branch are hindered or
negated in a CLI due to tension with key tenets or operative proposition of
another intersecting branch, this will likely produce profoundly detrimental
effects both in the CLI and the affected branch. This observation lends robust
support to the view that, where a coordination failure arises because the core of

251. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 76, at 52 (noting that, in financial regulation, conflicts between
objectives are not uncommon and to resolve them preferences among policy aims should be clearly defined).
252. On the balance between financial stability and competition policies in the banking sector, see generally
Allen N. Berger, Leora F. Klapper & Rima Turk-Ariss, Bank Competition and Financial Stability, 35 J FIN.
SERVS. RSCH. 99 (2009).
253. On the trade-offs that FinTech engenders towards market integrity and financial innovation, see
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 15, at 242 (“[W]hen seeking to (i) provide clear rules, (ii) maintain market
integrity, and (iii) encourage financial innovation, regulators can achieve, at best, two out of these three
objectives.”).
254. For an example of such interventions, see BARAK, supra note 19, at 363–70.
255. See supra Part II.C.
256. See supra Part III.A.1.
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one branch conflicts with the middle or the outer spheres of another,
interventions aimed at fostering legal coherence should presumptively seek to
prioritize the former. Nevertheless, such prioritization will demand caution.
Care will be necessary to ensure that interventions that favor the policy aims of
one branch over the key tenets or operative propositions of another do not
overreach to the point of compromising the policy aims of the latter.
The history of the CLI that emerges between antitrust law and patent law
in “cross-licensing arrangements”257 among competitors offers an illustrative
example of a single-core coordination failure and the interventions required to
address it.258 In the past, these transactions sparked tension between the policy
aims of antitrust law (for example, preventing competitors from entering into
anticompetitive arrangements) and key tenets of patent law (for example, the
right of patent holders to freely license their patents).259 From the 1960s to
1990s, there was ambiguity regarding the extent to which firms competing in the
same markets could enter into patent cross-licensing. Such arrangements were
positively permitted under patent law, but also attracted the scrutiny of antitrust
law.260 Following this phase of uncertainty caused by gaps in the applicable law,
the solution adopted by most jurisdictions was to carry out legislative and
regulatory interventions that have progressively prioritized antitrust concerns.261
These reforms were typically driven by the normative assessment that the
potential detrimental effect of unconstrained patent cross-licensing agreements
on competition law was deemed to markedly exceed the negative impact on
patent law of a mild curtailment of the otherwise unrestricted right to license
held by patent-holders.
2. Coordination Failures Not Involving Policy Aims
The second category comprises coordination failures that do not involve
policy aims. There are two types of such failures: “different-sphere failures” and
“same-sphere failures.”
Different-sphere failures are characterized by gaps or incongruences that
stem from tensions between the middle sphere of one of the intersecting
branches and the outer sphere of the other. When addressing coordination
failures of this nature, a path to legal coherence similar to that suggested above

257. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 530–36
(2015) (defining patent cross-licensing arrangements as “situations in which product-producing firms agree to
share technologies for some part of their production without fixing product prices or dividing the product
market”).
258. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE & MICHAEL
A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §§ 34.2a–42b (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2014) (providing an exhaustive analysis of this topic).
259. See Hovenkamp, supra note 257, at 532 (expounding all the scenarios in which cross-licensing
agreements create tension with antitrust policies).
260. Id. at 533–35. The literature and case law are exhaustively covered in HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note
258, § 34.
261. For a U.S. perspective, see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 258, § 34. For an E.U. perspective, see
DEVDATTA MALSHE, PATENT POOLS, COMPETITION LAW AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 38 (2018).
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for single-core failures should be followed. Specifically, it should be borne in
mind that key tenets articulate the fundamental concepts and doctrines of their
appertaining commercial law branch,262 and they establish the rules and
principles through which commercial law branches express their exceptional and
supplemental nature.263 This suggests that where a coordination failure arises
because of tension between the middle sphere of one commercial law branch
and the outer sphere of another, interventions aimed at fostering legal coherence
should presumptively prioritize key tenets over the intersecting operative
provisions.
An example of the negative consequences that can occur when operative
provisions are carelessly prioritized over key tenets was provided in Part II.A.
There, we discussed the CLI between secured transactions law and copyright
law which materializes when this intellectual property right is used as
collateral.264 We noted that the application of the lex superior canon of
construction results in the prioritization of copyright law operative provisions
(the Copyright Registry recordation regime for transfers) over key tenets of
secured transactions law (the perfection regime of Article 9).265 The resulting
regime positively hinders the use of copyright as collateral: it prevents parties
from relying on the efficient Article 9 regime and forces them instead to follow
the rules of Copyright law, which are sub-optimal for secured transactions.266
By contrast, same-sphere failures feature gaps or incongruences caused by
a conflict or tension between rules and principles that both belong either to the
middle sphere or the outer sphere of the intersecting branches. These two cases
present similarities as well as dissimilarities. They are similar in that they
involve a contraposition of rules and principles belonging to spheres of the same
type. They diverge in that the two cases under consideration generate challenges
that differ in nature and intensity. When CLI coordination failures feature
conflicts or tensions between key tenets, the rules and principles in play are
cornerstones of their respective commercial law branch. By contrast, when
operative provisions become embroiled, the structural impact for the intersecting
commercial law branches is less profound. The combination of these
characteristics weighs heavily against any intervention aimed at prioritizing one
set of rules and principles over the other, as neither one has greater significance
either in their appertaining branch or in the CLI in question.
When a prioritization does not offer a viable solution, fostering legal
coherence in the CLI must follow a different path. Specifically, its unity of
purpose should be extrapolated from the policy aims of the intersecting
branches. Resolving this type of coordination failure requires that rules and
262. See supra Part III.A.2.
263. See supra Part III.A.2.
264. See supra notes 128–132 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
266. This regime was criticized by Judge Kozinski as “a serious burden” in In re Peregrine Ent., Ltd., 116
B.R. 194, 202 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1990). See Haemmerli, supra note 105, at 1694–95 (providing scorching criticism
of the regime resulting from the intersection between the Copyright Act and Article 9).
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principles within the CLI are in alignment with the underpinning social,
economic, and political objectives of all intersecting branches.267 Nonetheless,
the available maneuvering space and the methods that can be deployed to ensure
such co-existence of rules differ markedly, depending on the spheres involved
and on the features of the rules and principles generating incongruences and
gaps. Legal coherence between key tenets may often be achieved through
interpretive interventions that take advantage of their open-texture and abstract
nature.268 By contrast, rules with a narrower scope and greater determinacy
might often necessitate legislative reform or regulatory interventions.269
The aforementioned CLI engendered by secured transactions law and
prudential regulation offers an illustration of the method required to address
coordination failures not involving policy aims. As discussed, loans that are
collateralized with personal property may be treated in the same guise of
unsecured credit under applicable capital requirements.270 The consequences of
this incongruent treatment of secured credit are far-reaching, possibly distorting
the incentive structure in the credit market.271 Yet, this coordination failure does
not entail conflicts or tensions between core spheres. Inclusive access to credit,
promoted through secured transactions law,272 presupposes and supports the
safety and soundness of markets and institutions pursued by prudential
regulation.273 Therefore, rules and principles pertaining to these different
branches should co-exist within a CLI the purpose of which is to promote a
“sound and inclusive access to credit.”274 Normatively, this understanding has
powerful implications. First, approaches designed to limit the applicability of
existing regulatory regimes to secured lending should be avoided, as they would
result in a de-regulatory action, unduly compromising the internal consistency
of capital regulation and, thus, frustrating their ability to reach stated policy
aims.275 Second, coherence can only be attained through legislative and
regulatory interventions that resolve incongruences by designing a system of

267. See supra Part II.C on the need for developing a purposive method to address CLI coordination failures.
268. Albeit not a necessary condition, key tenets are typically expressed at high level of generality. See
supra Part III.A.2. For some examples in this regard, see supra notes 237–242 and accompanying text.
269. This is a direct consequence of the trade-offs between flexibility and determinacy. See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
274. This guiding purpose reflects the combined application of the policy aims underlying the intersecting
branches under consideration. Promoting simultaneously financial inclusion and stability policies has been
recommended in Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 17, at 539 (indicating that a false dichotomy between this
policy aims may hinder the design of approaches that foster their advancement). Crucially, this recommendation
is a reflected goal of the World Bank to promote the establishment of “a sound and inclusive credit ecosystem”
when secured transactions and prudential regulation are implemented at the domestic level. See WB
KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 31.
275. On the notion of consistency, see supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. As noted, resolving
CLI coordination failures through a method solely focused on preserving the consistency within one branch is
likely to compromise the consistency of other intersecting branch(es). See supra note 133.
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rules and principles that coordinates the legal and the regulatory facets of
secured credit.276

CONCLUSION
In this Article we have offered three contributions to the study of CLIs and
their coordination failures. First, we have reviewed the factors that have driven
the proliferation of convergences between commercial law branches, as well as
the increase in the relevance of these overlaps for an expanding group of
business actors. Moreover, we have delved into coordination failures, showing
that their root causes are gaps and incongruences in the law, the ultimate
consequences of which are higher transaction costs and distortions of market
incentive structures.
Our second contribution has been to apply a legal theory lens to CLI
coordination failures. This perspective has provided us with robust arguments in
support of the thesis that legal coherence should be adopted as the guiding star
to reconcile tensions between commercial law branches. To this end, attention
should focus on the CLI in view of overcoming coordination failures by ensuring
that the relevant rules and principles are consistent both with each other and their
respective branches, and that such consistency is attained through a unity of
purpose.
Our third contribution has been to propose a normative blueprint,
comprising a two-step method to address CLI coordination failures. The first
step suggests a systemization to identify precisely the intersecting rules and
principles and appraise their systemic relevance within their appertaining
commercial law branch. The second step expounds the assessments to be
conducted, the factors to be weighed, and the range of possible interventions that
may be carried out to achieve legal coherence in the CLI under consideration.
Collectively, these contributions are intended to have a twofold impact. At
the most basic level, we want to offer an analytical framework that the legal
community can employ to identify transactions which involve CLIs, recognize
the presence of coordination failures, and appraise their severity.
At a broader level, we aspire to spark a reasoned discussion. Scholars,
judges, and practitioners alike are too often seduced by the temptation of dealing
superficially with CLIs suffering from coordination failures. In some cases, they
intentionally choose not to engage with the relevant gaps and incongruences. In
276. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of
Secured Transactions Law Reforms, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 663, 684 (2017) (“A comprehensive regulatory strategy,
rather than ad hoc interventions, is required to unlock the full potential of secured transactions law reforms.”);
Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 64 (“[C]oordination between secured transactions law and prudential
regulation, particularly capital requirements, should be addressed at the highest level of the lawmaking process—
notably, when international soft-laws are defined.”); WB KNOWLEDGE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 31
(“Coordination between secured transactions law reforms and prudential regulation requires designing a
jurisdiction-specific reform strategy for implementation.”). The IFC Regulatory Report further elaborates on this
point, indicating that “mere tweaks or abolishment of existing domestic rules” are not sufficient to resolve current
incongruences, and a strategy “to ensure coherence among legal and regulatory components supporting the credit
ecosystem” must be devised. IFC REGULATORY PRIMER, supra note 12, at 11.

April 2021]

COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS

1053

others, they apodictically advocate that one of the commercial law branches in
the intersection under consideration should prevail over the others, often
motivated by partisan reasons of convenience. We posit that CLIs should be
understood as systems of rules and logical deductions, the coordination failures
of which can only be conquered through the careful investigation of the
underlying socio-economic policies and political objectives of the intersecting
branches.
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